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ABSTRACT
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) 
established that financial reports of governmental entities 
should assist users in assessing accountability of 
politicians and bureaucracies (GASB 1987, 100.103).
Auditing standards promulgated for the governmental 
environment similarly emphasize administrative 
accountability to the public.
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require auditors 
to determine whether a governmental entity has complied 
with all applicable laws and regulations. If noncompliance 
is found to have a material effect on the financial 
statements, governmental auditors are required to report 
it. This study examined what level of reporting auditors 
use and what factors contribute to a lack of consensus in 
reporting decisions.
Specifically, auditor reporting decisions concerning 
municipal compliance with the Louisiana Local Government 
Budget Act were investigated. The Budget Act requires 
municipalities to amend their budgets if actual 
expenditures will exceed the budget by more than five 
percent. Auditors experienced in governmental auditing 
participated in an experiment, involving a small 
municipality that had contracted for an audit in accordance
vii
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with GAS. Subjects were asked where they would report 
noncoinpliance with the Budget Act.
Four independent variables were hypothesized to have 
an impact on reporting decisions: unfavorable budget
variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment 
sector of the auditor. Data were analyzed with chi-square 
tests, ordinal probit analysis, and correlation statistics.
Budget variance and employment sector of the auditor 
were found to affect reporting decisions. Neither fiscal 
stress nor political turnover was significant, however. 
Auditors working for the Legislative Auditor of the State 
of Louisiana reported all instances of noncompliance at the 
maximum disclosure level, the Compliance Report. Auditors 
employed in the private sector, however, apparently judged 
the materiality of noncompliance. When budget variance was 
sixteen percent, private sector auditors, like legislative 
auditors, reported noncompliance in the compliance report. 
However, when budget variance was seven percent, private 
practitioners chose lower levels of disclosure, such as 
footnotes or a management letter. Finally, legislative 
auditors demonstrated higher consensus than private 
practitioners.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Considerable research has investigated auditors' 
reporting decisions in the private sector (e.g. Holstrum & 
Messier, 1982; Messier, 1983; Krogstad, Ettenson, & 
Shanteau, 1984; and Chewning, Pany, & Wheeler, 1989), 
concentrating, for the most part, on materiality thresholds 
and auditor-client conflict. Private sector research may 
not be directly comparable to the public sector, however, 
as reporting decisions in governmental auditing differ from 
reporting decisions in private sector auditing for a 
variety of reasons. Icerman and Hillison (1989) pointed 
out that governmental auditors have stewardship 
responsibilities beyond those to investors, such as 
bondholders; they also have responsibilities to involuntary 
resource providers who are not constituents and to 
non-providers who receive government services.
Financial reports provide vital evidence in 
demonstrating governmental accountability. The 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) prescribes 
that financial reports should enable governmental agencies 
or political subdivisions to demonstrate public 
accountability and should assist users in assessing the 
level of administrative accountability (GASB, 1987,
100.103) .
1
2The additional stewardship responsibilities of the 
governmental auditor are reflected in the standards for 
governmental audits. Standards for a financial audit of a 
governmental agency fall into three categories: Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), Government Auditing 
Standards (GAS), and Single Audits. Fieldwork standards 
among the three categories are essentially the same; the 
differences are found primarily in the reporting 
requirements. Under GAAS, the only report required is an 
opinion on the financial statements. GAS audits encompass 
GAAS reporting requirements, but supplemental reports 
concerning internal controls and compliance with laws and 
regulations are also required. Finally, Single Audits 
require an additional schedule of findings and questioned 
costs and, if the entity receives federal financial 
assistance that qualifies as a major program, an opinion on 
compliance.1 The increased reporting required by each 
successive set of standards is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
In the state of Louisiana, municipalities are required 
by law to submit audited financial statements to the Office 
of the Legislative Auditor on an annual or biannual basis, 
depending on the size of their budgets. These financial
1 The Single Audit Act outlines a sliding scale which 
determines whether federal assistance constitutes a major 
program. This schedule is contained in the Glossary of 
Statement on Auditing Standards 68: Compliance Auditing
Applicable to Governmental Entities and Other Recipients of 
Governmental Financial Assistance (AICPA, 1992).
3SINGLE AUDIT
Reports Issued
Major Programs; Opinion on compliance, 
schedule of findings and questioned costs, and 
report on compliance with general requirements
Minor Programs; Statement of positive 
assurance about nonmajor federal financial 
assistance program transactions tested and 
negative assurance about transactions not 
tested; schedule of findings and questioned 
costs
GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS
Reports Issued
Statement of positive assurance about 
transactions tested and negative assurance 
about transactions not tested; report of 
material instances of noncompliance found
GENERALLY ACCEPTED AUDITING STANDARDS 
Report Issued
Opinion on financial statements
Figure 1.1
Reports Required under Various Auditing Standards
(Adapted from American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 63: 
Compliance Auditing Applicable to Governmental Entities and 
Other Recipients of Governmental Financial Assistance. New 
York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
1989.)
audits are to be conducted under GAS unless they are 
subject to Single Audit guidelines. Because few 
municipalities in the state receive sufficient federal 
funds to fall under the Single Audit Act, the majority 
engage auditors for GAS audits.
Government Auditing Standards require auditors to 
determine whether the entity has complied with laws and 
regulations. If an auditor determines that noncompliance 
has occurred, he or she must consider which of the 
available reporting options is appropriate. This study 
investigates auditor reporting decisions concerning 
compliance with the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act 
(hereafter the Budget Act), in performing municipal audits 
under GAS. Because the budget is a fundamental part of any 
government's financial reporting,2 it provides a broadly 
relevant setting for studying auditors' compliance 
reporting decisions.
According to GAS, auditors must report noncompliance 
with laws and regulations if noncompliance has a material 
effect on the financial statements. The materiality of 
noncompliance with the Budget Act is not clear cut; 
although the municipality may be sued for injunctive relief
2 Generally accepted accounting principles for 
governmental entities require that "the minimum budget 
basis presentation within the general purpose financial 
statements is the aggregation of the appropriated budgets 
[for revenues and expenditures], as amended, compared to 
related actuals." (Governmental Accounting Standards Board, 
1987, 2400.102)
(LSA-RS 39:1314), it is not liable for refund or loss of 
state grants or other aid received if it violates the 
Budget Act. Over-spending is, technically, an illegal act; 
the auditor may consider it significant and subject to some 
level of disclosure (AICPA, 1988) . It may also be 
appropriate to report violations of the budget because 
users of the financial statements expect certain types of 
findings to be reported, and public perceptions are clearly 
involved in budget related activity.
This study explores the reporting practices of 
governmental auditors. Specifically, the reporting 
practices of different groups of governmental auditors 
faced with noncompliance with the Budget Act in varying 
contexts are examined. The degree of budget variance, 
fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment sector of 
the auditor are hypothesized to impact compliance reporting 
decisions. In the following section, background 
information concerning GAS and auditor independence is 
discussed, followed by development of this study.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
Government Auditing Standards
Because most of the resources used to pay for 
governmental operating activities are provided 
involuntarily through various taxes, a need to assure 
accountability in administering those resources exists.
Hence, government agencies and political subdivisions must 
be audited for compliance with laws and regulations 
regarding expenditures and administration of government 
programs. SAS No. 68, Compliance Auditing Applicable to 
Governmental Entities and Other Recipients of Governmental 
Financial Assistance, which is concerned with GAAS, GAS, 
and Single Audits, requires that,
the auditor should obtain an understanding of the 
possible effects on financial statements of laws 
and regulations that are generally recognized by 
auditors to have a direct and material effect on 
the determination of amounts in a governmental 
entity's financial statements (AICPA, 1992, par. 
11) .
Auditors engaged to perform an audit in accordance 
with GAS, however, have additional responsibilities beyond 
those in a GAAS audit.3 The U. S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) states that primary among those 
responsibilities is the requirement that the auditor 
prepare a report on compliance with laws and regulations 
(GAO, 1988, 5-2, par. 5). The statement on compliance is 
considered significant because government organizations are
3 GAS are outlined in the Standards for Audits of 
Governmental Organizations. Programs. Activities, and 
Functions, promulgated by the U.S. General Accounting 
Office. In practice, GAS are often referred to as 
Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) or 
the "Yellow Book." The "Yellow Book" incorporates 
standards for financial audits and performance audits, but 
for the purposes of this study, GAS will refer only to the 
standards for financial audits.
created by law and generally must follow more specific 
rules and regulations than private entities (GAO, 1985).
In a GAS audit, the report on compliance may be 
included within the opinion on the financial statements or 
in a separate report. This report must contain positive 
assurance on those items that were tested for compliance as 
well as negative assurance on those items not tested.
All instances of noncompliance with laws and 
regulations that are material to the groups of accounts 
being audited should be reported. Material noncompliance 
also includes instances that individually are not material 
but when aggregated may have a material effect. If the 
compilation of immaterial items of noncompliance is still 
immaterial, the items may be disclosed separately in 
written or oral communication to the management of the 
entity and should not affect the audit opinion (GAO, 1988, 
5-2 - 5-3, pars. 5 - 8 ) .
Materiality is an inherently subjective judgment for 
the auditor. This may be especially true when an auditor 
is making a joint judgment of how noncompliance is 
translated into a dollar impact and whether that impact is 
material to the financial statements. This subjectivity, 
as well as the increased disclosure options in a GAS audit, 
may lead to diverse reporting practices.
Nondisclosure of noncompliance when present, 
therefore, may signal a number of underlying conditions.
The auditor may not have detected the noncompliance. If 
the noncompliance was detected but not reported, the 
auditor may have either determined that it was not material 
or may have chosen to communicate privately to the client, 
via oral communication or management letter. In any of 
these cases, if an outside observer believes that public 
disclosure was warranted, the auditor's performance may be 
questioned.
Reports on Governmental Audit Quality
In response to growing public concern in the early 
1980s over waste and mismanagement of federal funds, the U. 
S. Congress directed more attention to compliance issues 
within grantee agencies. In July, 1984, at the request of 
Congress, the GAO reviewed audits for 46 regional offices 
of seven Inspectors General. These audits covered agencies 
administering 95 percent of all domestic federal 
assistance.
For the purposes of the GAO study, audit quality was 
defined as "compliance with professional standards set out 
for the particular type of audit considered" (GAO, 1985,
8). Audits were selected for the GAO study based on prior 
regional inspectors' general experience with the audit 
firms, results of routine desk reviews performed for each 
audit, and whether or not the audit firm had previously 
been contracted for agency audits.
The results of these studies revealed that, in the 
judgment of the GAO, 34 percent of the audits were not 
performed in compliance with professional standards. 
Problems concerning failure to report noncompliance were 
found in 25 percent of the reports reviewed, and one in 
five reviewed revealed a failure to perform a majority of 
the required audit work in a major segment of the audit.
The reviewers found unexplained inaccuracies, missing 
schedules, inadequate descriptions of the audit scope, and 
insufficient documentation. The two predominant problems 
were related to compliance and internal control. Of the 
sample of audits reviewed, 12.5 percent had problems 
identifying noncompliance with laws and regulations. In 
addition, insufficient evidence was a frequent problem, 
especially evidence associated with compliance issues (GAO, 
1985). It is important to note, however, that audits for 
the GAO quality review studies were not selected at random, 
so the proportion of audits of poor quality may have been 
overstated.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) responded to the findings of the GAO regarding 
audit quality by establishing a task force to study the 
problem. In 1987, it released the Report of the Task Force 
on the Quality of Audits of Governmental Units. This 
report (dubbed "The Five E's") contained recommendations to 
improve public sector audit quality. The five categories
of recommendations focused on education, engagement of 
auditors, evaluation of audit quality, enforcement of 
standards, and exchange of information (AICPA, 1987). In
addition, the AICPA increased the emphasis on governmental 
accounting and auditing in the Uniform CPA Examination. 
Governmental auditing has been added to the content 
specification for the auditing section of the exam, and in 
the new format to be used beginning in 1994, governmental 
accounting will constitute 30 percent of the financial 
accounting and reporting section.
Compliance reporting has been cited as a problem area
by both the AICPA and the GAO. However, the AICPA 
recommendations and the accounting literature provide 
neither insight nor the results of research into the manner 
in which compliance reporting decisions are made. The 
AICPA task force recommendations provided general solutions 
to improve governmental audit quality, but they did not 
specifically address compliance reporting practices or 
provide guidance for materiality judgments. Further, 
research into reporting decisions has focused on the 
private sector, where compliance reports are absent, and 
research in governmental accounting and auditing has 
largely ignored the compliance issue altogether.
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AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Reporting decisions are dependent on two sometimes 
conflicting goals of the auditor: 1) maintaining auditor
independence and professional integrity, and 2) retaining 
the client (Goldman & Bariev, 1974). If a municipality or 
other auditee is in compliance with all applicable laws and 
regulations, the auditor can meet both these goals 
simultaneously by issuing an unqualified opinion and a 
clean compliance report.4 However, if the auditee is not 
in compliance with applicable laws, and the auditee resists 
disclosure, conflict may result. Questions of disclosure 
in situations of conflict have been considered from the 
perspective of auditor independence in prior audit research 
(e.g., Shockley, 1981; Knapp, 1985, 1987).
Auditor independence is considered the foundation of 
the auditing profession (Littleton, 1965). Independence 
has to do with the individual auditor maintaining a proper 
attitude in three aspects of the audit: planning,
performance of procedures, and preparation of the report 
(Mautz and Sharaf, 1961). Elaborating on independence in 
reporting, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) stated that the auditor 
must avoid "excluding significant matters from the formal 
report in favor of their inclusion in an informal report of 
any kind" (207).
4 For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that 
the financial account balances have been found to be 
presented fairly.
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DeAngelo (1981b) said that perfect auditor 
independence occurs when the conditional probability that 
the auditor will report a discovered breach if a breach is 
found is equal to one. She added that, "the greater the 
incentive for the auditor to tell the truth, the greater 
the value of the auditor's opinion" (116). The competitive 
nature of the auditing business has the potential to lead 
to less than perfect auditor independence. Goldman and 
Bariev (1974, 707) pointed out that "the threat to 
independence is built into the structure of this 
professional role and that pressures not to perform 
according to professional standards are constantly 
created."
Competition among audit firms for a given client 
sometimes leads audit firms to bid low, even below cost, in 
the initial engagement. In subsequent engagements by the 
same client, the audit firm will earn economic quasi-rents 
due to technological advantages the incumbent auditor 
enjoys and costs to the client of changing auditors 
(DeAngelo, 1981b). Termination of the auditor-client 
relationship is costly to both parties, in that the auditor 
loses quasi-rents and the client bears start-up costs 
associated with a new auditor. Therefore, significant 
incentives exist for both parties to maintain the 
professional relationship. These incentives make the 
auditor more susceptible to client pressure not to disclose
13
a breach; conversely, the lower costs involved for the 
client if the incumbent auditor is retained may make the 
client less inclined to terminate the relationship over a 
disclosure disagreement (DeAngelo, 1981b).
Compromises of audit quality for the purposes of 
client retention also pose potential costs to the auditor. 
Should the reporting decision be questioned, the 
professional integrity of the auditor may be affected by 
sanctions, the auditor may suffer the loss of reputation 
and clientele, and legal liabilities may result (Shockley, 
1982) . Therefore, auditors with a large client base are 
likely to lose more by failing to report a breach than by 
losing a particular series of client-specific quasi-rents 
(DeAngelo, 1981c).
A substantial portion of municipal audits, however, 
are conducted by small audit firms. For such firms, the 
fee from one governmental client could be a large 
proportion of revenues, giving rise to the possibility that 
the loss of a particular client could have a significant 
impact on the audit firm. Municipalities are also not 
necessarily subject to the market pressures that demand 
high quality audits. Governmental audits have 
traditionally posed a lower business risk for audit firms; 
litigation is less likely and sanctions have been less 
common until recently (GAO, 1986; AICPA, 1987).
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In recent years, however, peer review and quality 
assurance programs have increased the probability that 
disclosure decisions will come under scrutiny. Every 
audited set of financial statements submitted to the Office 
of the Legislative Auditor of Louisiana receives a quality 
assurance review. However, compliance reporting decisions 
concerning significant but non-material items, such as 
violations of the Budget Act, are rarely scrutinized 
(Austin, personal communication, 1991). A sample of 
governmental audits also undergoes a full desk review by 
the Society of Louisiana Certified Public Accountants, 
where more attention is given to reporting treatment of 
such items.
The Legislative Auditor must approve all municipal 
audit engagements, thus repeated findings of questionable 
reporting decisions may impair an auditor's ability to 
maintain a governmental audit practice. Although potential 
legal liability in a municipal audit is fairly low and 
minimizes business risk for the auditor, the possibility of 
being prohibited from conducting future governmental 
engagements increases the business risk in making 
questionable reporting decisions strictly to keep a 
specific client. Further, DeAngelo (1981a) noted that if 
an auditor gains industry-specific knowledge in the course 
of an audit, then that knowledge carries over to other 
clients in the same industry, mitigating the losses
associated with losing one specific client. The opposing 
forces of small firm size and industry specialization, as 
well as low litigation risk and increasing scrutiny, make 
it unclear how susceptible municipal auditors may be to 
pressures to underreport noncompliance.
COMPLIANCE REPORTING OPTIONS
Upon discovery of a governmental client's failure to 
comply with applicable laws and regulations, the auditor 
must consider some level of disclosure. Several options 
exist for reporting noncompliance, ranging from oral 
communication to the compliance report.
First, for noncompliance considered nonmaterial, 
reporting standards for financial audits state that, 
"nonmaterial instances of noncompliance need not be 
disclosed in the compliance report but should be reported 
in a separate communication to the audited entity, 
preferably in writing" (GAO, 1988, 5-3, par 8). This 
standard provides the auditor with a choice of discussing 
noncompliance orally with the auditee or addressing it in a 
management letter. A management letter could reasonably be 
considered to be higher level reporting than oral 
communication, however, especially in the governmental 
context, because many written documents that might remain
16
confidential in the private sector become part of the 
public record.5
The next higher level of reporting available to the 
auditor is disclosure of noncompliance in the footnotes to 
the financial statements. Although GAS do not specify the 
role of footnotes in noncompliance reporting, footnotes 
have traditionally been used to disclose items not 
significant enough to include directly in the financial 
statements or the auditor's report but too significant to 
omit from the financial statements altogether. Footnote 
disclosure can be considered a higher level of reporting 
than the management letter because they are part of the 
publicly disseminated financial statements. Conversely, 
the footnotes can be considered a lower level of disclosure 
than the reports, as the reports tend to highlight 
instances of noncompliance.
Finally, if the auditor deems noncompliance to be 
material relative to the financial statements, the 
noncompliance should be reported in the compliance report
5 When a municipality in Louisiana engages an 
independent auditor, the Legislative Auditor must approve 
the engagement. The standard letter sent by the 
Legislative Auditor contains the stipulation that copies of 
all management letters are to be sent to the Legislative 
Auditor along with the annual report. Therefore, although 
the management letter is not publicly disseminated with the 
annual report, it is part of the public record available to 
interested parties requesting information from the 
Legislative Auditor.
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(GAO, 1988, 5-3). Specifically, paragraph 5 of the 
reporting standards states:
The auditors should prepare a written report on 
their tests of compliance with applicable laws 
and regulations. This report, which may be 
included in either the report on the financial 
audit or a separate report . . . should include 
all material instances of noncompliance. . .(GAO, 
1988, 5-2; emphasis added).
Auditing standards do not specify a disclosure 
hierarchy between the compliance report and the opinion on 
the financial statements. By permitting the report on 
noncompliance to be either a part of the opinion or a 
separate document, the standards imply that the opinion and 
the compliance report are equal in stature.6 Whether 
noncompliance is reported in the footnotes, the compliance 
report, or the opinion, it is made part of the report 
readily available to third parties, making each a form of 
public disclosure.
It is possible that audit clients perceive a 
difference in the level of reporting if noncompliance is 
disclosed in the compliance report rather than the opinion. 
If so, the auditor may be able to satisfy a client in a 
conflict situation by reporting noncompliance in the
6 This interpretation was supported in a conversation 
with William Anderson, Jr., Project Manager at the GAO. 
According to Mr. Anderson, in the opinion of the GAO, the 
opinion on the financial statements, the compliance report, 
and the report on internal controls are equal and integral 
parts of the auditor's report.
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compliance report rather than the opinion because the 
opinion is likely to be considered the highest level of 
disclosure. This is strictly conjecture, however, and 
therefore no hierarchical differentiation is assumed for 
the purposes of this study.
The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act
Any municipality is subject to numerous federal, 
state, and local laws and regulations that may affect the 
financial statements. In the state of Louisiana, one law 
applicable to each municipality is the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act (LSA-RS 39:1301-1314). For local 
governments, the budget is perhaps the most significant 
document, in that it drives government activities and 
provides a standard for accountability (Ives, 1985). 
Therefore, because this law applies to each municipality, 
and the budget is central to the accounting process in a 
governmental entity, this study investigates auditors' 
compliance reporting decisions involving municipal 
compliance with the Budget Act.
The Budget Act requires each political subdivision in 
Louisiana to adopt an annual budget before the beginning of 
the fiscal year. When there is a change in operations 
during the fiscal year such that public expenditures will 
exceed the original budget by more than five percent, the 
Budget Act requires that the budget be amended. Exceeding
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the budget is fairly common. Baron (1989) found that, 
among a sample of towns in New Mexico, 34 percent exceeded 
the budget. Of a sample of 100 municipalities in Louisiana 
studied in the development of this project, 68 exceeded the 
budget for expenditures, 40 by five percent or more.
Because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) require the minimum budget presentation for 
governmental entities to include comparisons of the 
appropriated budgets to related actual revenues and 
expenditures (GASB, 1987, 2400.103), the dollar variance 
from the budget will be disclosed in audited financial 
statements.7 However, if the budget for expenditures, as 
amended, is exceeded by more than five percent, the 
municipality is in violation of the Budget Act. In such 
cases, the level of disclosure of noncompliance with the 
law becomes an issue to the auditor.
Depending on the professional judgment of the auditor, 
the violation may be disclosed publicly in the footnotes, 
the compliance report, or the audit opinion. However, if 
the auditor believes that the presentation of the budget 
variance in the financial statements is sufficient, or if 
the noncompliance is judged not to be material or
7 In the state of Louisiana, political subdivisions 
are required to submit financial reports that conform to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and that 
have been audited under GAS on a periodic basis (LSA-RS 
24:517). If an entity is a recipient of at least $100,000 
of federal financial assistance, however, the audit must be 
performed under Single Audit guidelines, under federal law.
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significant, he or she may decide that private disclosure, 
such as a management letter or oral communication, would 
suffice.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The more material the auditor considers the violation, 
the higher order of disclosure it should receive, ceteris 
paribus (Boatsman & Robertson, 1974). But because there is 
some flexibility in the reporting decision, compliance may 
be an area where an auditor is more likely to encounter 
client pressure to minimize disclosure or to issue an 
inappropriate report (Nichols & Price, 1976; Goldman & 
Bariev, 1974). Speaking to this point, Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961, 218) noted the difficulty of maintaining auditor 
independence:
Certainly some practitioners are strong enough to 
resist any temptation and any pressure that may 
be brought to bear on their independence. And 
just as certainly other practitioners find real 
independence a little more than they can manage 
in the face of considerable pressure and under 
the conditions of professional practice.
Knapp (1987) found that audit committees will be less 
likely to support the auditor in a conflict with the client 
when reporting flexibility exists, and financial statement 
users perceive that the auditor will be less likely to 
withstand auditor pressure (Knapp, 1985). The reporting 
decision in a flexible situation, such as one where
21
materiality is not clearly defined and where multiple 
public and private reporting options are available, may 
therefore reflect the auditor's balance between the two 
goals of client retention and maintaining independence.
Independence issues in municipal audits have not been 
examined in the accounting literature. However, impairment 
of independence seems more likely to go undetected in 
municipal audits, where audit firms are small, litigation 
risk is low, and flexibility is present. Therefore inquiry 
into reporting decisions in this sector is warranted. The 
foregoing leads to the following research questions:
1. What level of reporting noncompliance with the 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act is selected by 
auditors?
2. What factors are associated with a lack of consensus 
in reporting decisions?
A prominent line of research into audit judgments has 
analyzed cue usage in the framework of developing linear 
models of auditors' decisions. In the area of control and 
planning judgments, this research has included work by 
Ashton (1974), Ashton and Brown (1980), and Hamilton and 
Wright (1982). Holstrum and Messier (1982) provided a 
review of judgment capturing experiments in materiality. 
These experiments investigated which controls were 
considered most important, how risk affected judgments, 
which cues were influential in making joint
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materiality/reporting decisions, and how the role of the 
auditor affected the opinion given.
Auditor independence has also received considerable 
attention in the accounting literature. Much of this 
research has focused on which factors may affect pressures 
on the auditor to be less than independent, such as 
routineness of the service provided and benefit to the 
client (Goldman & Bariev, 1974; Nichols & Price, 1976; and 
Shockley, 1982) as well as size of the audit firm 
(DeAngelo, 1981c). Perceptions by others of auditor 
independence has also been addressed by past research 
(Shockley, 1982; Knapp, 1985).
Because of the unique nature of governmental audits, 
many of these issues warrant reconsideration in the public 
sector environment. The fiduciary responsibility is not 
comparable between government agencies and business 
organizations; accountability to the public for resources 
provided involuntarily is of paramount importance in 
financial reporting by governments (Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board, 1987, pars. 100.156 - 158). Furthermore, 
the emphasis in government is on efficient and effective 
management of resources and/or equitable distribution of 
services and provision of public goods rather than profit 
or maximization of shareholder value (Appleby, 1945; 
Frederickson, 1971).
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Stewardship has historically been the primary function 
of accounting for municipalities; heterogeneous groups of 
constituents, such as bondholders, taxpayers, voters, and 
legislators have different interests in monitoring the 
safekeeping of assets, accountability of administrators, 
and compliance with laws, regulations, and legally binding 
covenants (Copeland & Ingram, 1983). Thus, auditors must 
consider how these dissimilar groups are best served by 
financial statements and audit reports under different 
conditions.
This study examines governmental auditor reporting 
decisions under different conditions as reflections of the 
balance struck between maintaining professional integrity 
(i.e., independence) and retaining clients. While there 
are many factors that potentially affect the reporting 
decision, this study considers budget variance, fiscal 
stress, political turnover, and employment sector.
RESEARCH METHOD
The decision of interest in this research is the 
disclosure decision in auditing for compliance during a 
financial statement audit. The particular law considered 
in this study is the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act, 
with which all municipalities or other political 
subdivisions of the state must comply. In particular, the 
Act requires municipalities to adopt a budget amendment if
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expenditures exceed the original budget by more than five 
percent (LSA-RS 39:1309-1310).
The research questions above were investigated in the 
context of the Budget Act using a quasi-experimental 
design. The dependent variable in the experiment was the 
reporting decision (RD). The auditor has the following six 
options in reporting:
1. No communication
2. Oral communication with management
3. Management letter
4. Footnote disclosure
5. Compliance report
6. Financial statement report (Opinion)
The experimental task consisted of sixteen cases 
involving a small municipality that had contracted for an 
audit in accordance with GAS. Subjects were asked where, 
if anywhere, they would report noncompliance with the 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act. The responses of 
the auditors were analyzed for the impact of four 
independent variables on compliance reporting decisions 
made.
The first independent variable was unfavorable budget 
variance, which was manipulated at three levels. One 
indicated compliance with the Louisiana Local Government 
Budget Act, and was primarily included as a validity check 
to ensure that subjects understood the law. The other two 
levels indicated different degrees of noncompliance with 
the Budget Act.
25
The second independent variable was fiscal stress, and 
the third independent variable was political turnover.
These two factors were expected to reflect pressures that 
impinge on auditor independence and therefore might lower 
audit quality and the level of the reporting option chosen.
The fourth independent variable was employment group. 
Subjects for the experiment were auditors either in the 
private sector or working for the Legislative Auditor of 
Louisiana. These two groups had experience in compliance 
auditing, but it was expected there might be differences in 
the groups because of the amount of compliance experience 
and the compliance emphasis in the training and management 
of the two groups. The auditors' decisions were modelled 
using descriptive statistics and ordinal probit analysis. 
Finally, consensus within groups was analyzed using 
Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients.
CONTRIBUTIONS
This research had two primary goals. The first was to 
investigate reporting decisions regarding compliance in 
governmental audits, an area that has become of increasing 
concern to the U. S. government and the AICPA, but which 
has received little attention in the academic literature. 
The emphasis on compliance, rather than financial, auditing 
makes this a unique study.
Secondly, the study investigated the reporting 
differences between groups of auditors. The 
compliance-centered training and experience of the staff in 
the Legislative Audit group was expected to result in 
different patterns of reporting decisions than would be 
found in the less specialized private practitioner group.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as 
follows: Chapter Two reviews a sample of the literature
pertaining to reporting and which variables may affect 
auditors when making reporting decisions. Chapter Three 
develops the specific hypotheses to be tested and describes 
the research method used. Chapter Four provides the 
results of the experiment, and finally Chapter Five 
summarizes the findings, the limitations of the study, and 
avenues for future research.
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study considers the factors that may affect 
compliance reporting decisions in a governmental context. 
Although there has been little experimental research in the 
area of governmental auditing, much of the research in 
private sector auditing pertains to this study. A directly 
related area of audit research considers materiality and 
reporting judgments. Materiality research has focused 
primarily on financial factors affecting materiality 
judgments. A subset of that research stream has 
investigated how materiality judgments are manifested in 
reporting decisions.
Often in the literature, reporting decisions are also 
considered reflective of auditor independence. Prior 
writings on independence have varied from strictly 
analytical to experimental. The analytical writings have 
considered factors that may actually impair independence, 
whereas most empirical research has concentrated on factors 
that give the appearance of impaired independence. This 
discrepancy may result from the difficulty researchers have 
in measuring or capturing independence in the experimental 
environment.
Finally, an area of considerable activity in 
accounting research has been the impact of experience or
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knowledge on audit judgments. Past research has considered 
the impact of experience in several accounting issues, and 
the understanding of expertise is rapidly evolving in the 
accounting literature. Issues concerning experience as it 
pertains to the subjects in this study will also be 
discussed within this review.
Studies of materiality and reporting issues will be 
discussed first, followed by a brief introduction to the 
independence literature. Finally, studies concerning 
experience and knowledge will be discussed. However, 
because auditor independence and experience affect 
reporting decisions and judgments of materiality, the three 
research areas outlined above overlap in the literature.
MATERIALITY AND REPORTING
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require 
noncompliance to be reported in the compliance report if it 
is considered to be material to the financial statements.
As in Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), no 
specific guidance is provided as to what constitutes 
material noncompliance. Several studies have investigated 
auditor judgments of materiality in the private sector, but 
little research has investigated materiality in the 
governmental sector. Some of the private sector studies 
have looked at materiality in isolation, while others have
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investigated reporting decisions as evidence of materiality 
judgments. Both types of studies will be discussed below.
Materiality
The early research in materiality focused primarily on 
understanding which financial factors auditors used in 
determining materiality thresholds. Moriarity and Barron 
(1976) conducted an experiment in which hypothetical cases 
were constructed manipulating income before tax, earnings 
trends, and client size in total assets. The audit partner 
subjects were asked to rank the cases in order of 
materiality of a change in an asset's useful life. Income 
was found to be the dominant factor in assessing 
materiality. Earnings trend and firm size were not 
significant for most subjects.
In a review of materiality literature, Holstrum and 
Messier (1982) found that such results were common to most 
studies. The effect of adjustments on net income was the 
predominant factor in all studies they reviewed. In 
general, they found that an adjustment to net income of 
less than four percent was almost always immaterial and 
that adjustments of over ten percent were almost always 
material. Consensus was lacking in the literature 
concerning the range between four and ten percent of net 
income.
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Another finding common to most studies reviewed was 
that materiality thresholds were different for various 
groups concerned with financial statements. The threshold 
was lowest among user groups, including investors, loan 
officers, and regulators. The threshold was highest for 
financial statement preparers, with the materiality 
threshold falling somewhere in between for auditors. 
Holstrum and Messier (1982) concluded that the lack of 
materiality guidance from standard setting bodies results 
in confusion and a lack of consensus. This particular gap 
between the expectations of users, auditors, and preparers 
may only be remedied by the development of more specific 
guidelines.
Krogstad, Ettenson, and Shanteau (1984) developed an 
experiment to test whether qualitative issues were 
considered as well as financial data in making materiality 
judgments. Audit partners, seniors, and university 
students were asked to indicate the relative materiality of 
a proposed adjustment to the allowance for doubtful 
accounts. Three financial cues manipulated were the effect 
on net income, the current ratio, and the earnings per 
share trend. Five qualitative factors manipulated in the 
experiment were industry trends, management 
cooperativeness, internal control structure, the expected 
users of the statements, and management's accounting policy 
conservativeness.
As in numerous prior accounting studies, the effect on 
net income accounted for the majority of variability in 
auditor judgments; however, no one signal was of 
predominant importance for the student subjects. None of 
the qualitative factors was significant when subjects were 
pooled in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) model, but when 
participants were modelled individually, qualitative 
factors were significant. Different subjects responded to 
different qualitative data, resulting in the insignificance 
of these factors in the pooled model.
Krogstad, Ettenson, and Shanteau (1984) also measured 
consensus among the three groups of subjects. In the 
auditing environment, where "correct” responses are not 
usually available, consensus has been employed in the 
literature as a measure of expert judgment (Dirsmith, 
Covaleski, and McAllister, 1985). The study found no 
significant difference in consensus betv/een the two 
practitioner groups, but students demonstrated 
significantly less consensus than the practitioners. The 
authors concluded that most of the learning germane to the 
materiality task occurs by the time an auditor reaches the 
senior level, but that the task was sufficiently complex to 
differentiate practitioners from students.
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Reporting Decisions
Another line of materiality research looks beyond 
determining materiality thresholds into the question of how 
materiality affects reporting decisions. Boatsman and 
Robertson (1974) requested participants in an experiment to 
sort cases into three disclosure methods. Based on eight 
financial and market data items, Certified Public 
Accountants (CPAs) and security analysts were asked whether 
the item a) was immaterial and should not be disclosed, b) 
should be disclosed in the footnotes but not in the body of 
the statements, or c) should be disclosed as a separate 
line item.
As in other materiality studies, subjects placed most 
of the weight of their decisions (73 percent of response 
variability) on the effect on net income. A dummy variable 
reflecting whether the item was a gain or loss on non- 
current assets was also significant, as was a market risk 
factor. However, a predictive model developed from a 
linear discriminant function of the decisions performed 
little better than a model based on a simple materiality 
cutoff of 4 percent of net income. Finally, the decision 
models of the CPAs and security analysts were not found to 
be significantly different from each other.
Stephens (1983) tested whether auditors in an 
experiment modified opinions based on the materiality of an 
item as well as the weight of audit evidence. Auditors
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evaluated ten cases and made recommendations for the 
opinion to be given. Materiality was manipulated by a 
change in revenue recognition leading to a 1 - 2 percent 
versus 15 - 17 percent change in net income.
Contrary to expectations, subjects recommended 
modified opinions even when the item was immaterial. The 
weight of evidence did not affect reporting decisions. In 
this experiment, the presence of even a small change led to 
a high freguency of modified opinions, even when generally 
accepted auditing standards suggest an ungualified opinion 
would be appropriate. This study did not consider any of 
the factors which might pressure auditors not to modify 
opinions however.
Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989) studied actual 
reporting decisions to investigate materiality judgments in 
practice. They gathered data on companies listed in the 
Compustat tapes to determine reporting patterns when 
companies made a change in accounting principle. In line 
with past research, modifications of the audit opinion 
increased as the effect of the change on net income 
increased. The materiality threshold appeared to be 
approximately four percent of net income; nearly all 
opinions were qualified when the change was greater than 
four percent. Even if the change represented less than a 4 
percent change in net income, however, a majority of 
opinions contained a consistency exception.
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Chewning, Pany and Wheeler (1989) also investigated 
whether reporting decisions differed between discretionary 
and nondiscretionary accounting changes. Below the four 
percent materiality threshold, opinions were modified less 
frequently if the change was nondiscretionary than if the 
change was made at the option of management. Lastly, then 
Big 8 firms modified opinions less frequently than other 
firms, indicating that the Big 8 firms had higher 
materiality thresholds.
The findings of Chewning, Pany and Wheeler (1989) 
differ somewhat from most prior research in materiality, 
although they are similar to those of Stephens (1983). The 
threshold seemed to be lower than those found in 
experimental studies. In addition, although auditing 
standards do not differentiate between discretionary and 
nondiscretionary changes, auditors apparently did 
differentiate. This finding does not concur with Knapp's 
(1985, 1987) experimental studies in auditor independence, 
which implied that auditors are more susceptible to 
management pressures not to qualify opinions if technical 
standards do not specify certain actions.
A common element of the materiality and reporting 
research discussed above is that it probes decisions in the 
private sector. Although much of the research can be 
expected to pertain to governmental auditing, differences 
between the for-profit and governmental sectors must be
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considered. First, the goal of private businesses is 
generally to generate income and/or shareholder value, and 
net income can be considered to be reflective of a 
company's success in achieving its goals. A governmental 
entity exists not to generate income but to provide 
services, and there is no measure of success comparable to 
net income. If net income is the basis for materiality 
judgments in the private sector, what should be the 
measuring stick for auditors in governmental engagements?
One possible alternative guide for materiality 
suggested in the private sector has been the size of the 
firm. Firm size has received moderate support as a 
materiality determinant in the literature (Holstrum and 
Messier, 1982), and where it was supported, total assets 
have generally served as the proxy for size. The 
governmental accounting treatment of fixed assets differs 
substantially from accrual accounting, however. Assets are 
recorded as expenditures when purchased as well as in a 
subsidiary ledger of fixed assets which are not 
depreciated. Therefore total fixed assets in a 
governmental entity are not equivalent to total assets in a 
private business, so they may not serve as an analogous 
guideline for materiality judgments.
The second issue which may differentiate private 
sector and governmental materiality and reporting issues is 
that in the past, local governments have been relatively
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isolated from the negative consequences of modified audit 
opinions experienced in the private sector (Lynn and 
Gaffney, 1990). Many local governments do not need to 
consider market reactions to qualified audit reports. Even 
those that have bonds traded on the market may not be 
damaged by qualified reports, as they are fairly common 
among governmental entities. Only twenty-one percent of 
cities with populations over 100,000 surveyed by Giroux
(1989) had unqualified opinions on their financial 
statements.
Lynn and Gaffney (1990) studied auditor perceptions of 
the messages inherent in qualified audit opinions of 
governmental entities. Fifty-nine auditors were shown six 
audit opinions of a hypothetical local government and were 
asked to rate the similarity of all possible pairs of 
opinions. Two of the opinions concerned the General 
Purpose Financial Statements (GPFS), and four concerned 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR). The CAFR, 
which includes individual fund accounts as well as the 
GPFS, is a more thorough report requiring increased audit 
scope. Each subject compared unqualified and qualified 
opinions of GPFSs and CAFRs, a disclaimer on a CAFR, and an 
adverse opinion on an incomplete CAFR. Subjects were also 
asked to rate the six audit opinions on nine attributes 
concerning the role of the auditor and the value of the 
opinions.
Analysis of subjects' comparisons indicated that 
auditors perceived a lesser difference between unqualified 
and qualified opinions than between qualified opinions and 
disclaimers or adverse opinions. On individual attributes, 
however, auditors generally rated the qualified opinions 
more closely to the disclaimers and adverse opinions than 
to the unqualified opinions. In general, the attribute 
scores indicated that auditors believed the auditor was 
more responsible for the content and made a more complete 
inspection of the statements if the opinion was unqualified 
than if it was not. The auditors also believed that the 
opinions were more sufficient for user needs, e.g., that 
risk associated with the statements was lower and 
additional information was not needed, if the opinion was 
unqualified.
In summary, when the auditors in the Lynn and Gaffney
(1990) study considered the overall message of opinions, 
qualified opinions were considered similar to unqualified 
opinions. However, when the implications of the opinions 
for the attributes of the accompanying statements were 
considered, auditors rated qualified opinions as being more 
similar to disclaimers and adverse opinions than to 
unqualified opinions.
If auditors are uncertain about how to interpret the 
messages being sent by different types of audit opinions in 
a governmental context, it is unclear what the role of
opinions and compliance reports would be if the auditor and 
client disagreed about disclosure of noncompliance. If 
auditors perceive qualified opinions to be similar to 
unqualified opinions, then the auditor may resist pressure 
to minimize disclosure of noncompliance by convincing the 
client that the compliance report will not be damaging. On 
the other hand, if exceptions in the opinion and the 
additional reports in a governmental audit are viewed to be 
similar to disclaimers or adverse opinions, then the client 
may increase pressure and the auditor may be more reluctant 
threaten to the relationship by disclosing noncompliance.
When auditors and their clients disagree about 
disclosure, the auditor must resolve the conflict. The 
auditor must strike a balance between keeping the client 
happy, in order to ensure repeat engagements, and 
maintaining the appropriate level of professional 
detachment, or independence. A considerable body of 
accounting research literature addresses this issue; an 
introduction to auditor independence as it pertains to this 
study is provided below. Following a discussion of 
independence issues in general, factors that may have an 
impact on auditor independence in a municipal environment 
will be considered, and pertinent research will be 
discussed.
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Theoretical Framework
One of the fundamental rules of the auditing 
profession is that auditors must be independent from their 
clients. Independence has been defined in a number of ways 
by different writers on the topic. Penno and Watts (1991, 
207) provide a definition of auditor independence that 
encompasses reporting practices specifically:
[An independent auditor is] one whose 
preferences over financial reporting 
alternatives are unaffected (both 
directly and indirectly) by 
management's preferences.
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) stress the importance of 
independence in appearance as well as in fact. They contend 
that the appearance of independence is necessary if 
auditing is to be accepted as a profession and if audited 
financial statements are to be valued by the public.
Goldman and Bariev (1974) noted that by the very 
structure of the auditing profession, where auditors are 
contracted by firms yet are expected to remain independent 
of those firms, pressures to compromise independence are 
inherently present. If an auditor chooses a reporting 
option that reflects negatively on the client, it is 
possible that the client will not engage the auditor in the 
future.
Shockley (1982) analyzed the auditor-client 
relationship from a power-control theory perspective. He 
identified two factors which affect the auditor's power vis 
a vis the client. The first factor is the routineness of 
the services being provided by the auditor. Routineness is 
directly related to competition for audit services. The 
more routine the service, the more likely it is that other 
auditors are available to perform the service. It follows, 
then, that increased competition for audit services 
increases the power of the client and threatens to impair 
auditor independence.
In a series of papers, DeAngelo (1981a, 1981b, 1981c) 
derived economic models of the auditor-client relationship. 
Because auditing is a competitive business, audit firms may 
bid below cost for the initial engagement to attract new 
clients (DeAngelo, 1981b). Client-specific knowledge 
carries over to future engagements, however, reducing costs 
associated with subsequent audits. This enables the 
auditor to earn a series of economic quasi-rents, providing 
incentive for the auditor to compromise independence to 
maintain client relationships.
There are, however, disincentives that counterbalance 
threats to auditor independence. If an auditor is caught 
compromising independence, he or she faces loss of 
reputation and may also face sanctions and even legal 
liability (DeAngelo, 1981c; Shockley, 1982). If an auditor
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is considering compromising independence, the possibility 
of losing a series of client-specific guasi-rents must be 
weighed against the possibility of losing other clients due 
to loss of reputation if discovered.
Several factors may affect the relative weights of 
these two possibilities. DeAngelo (1981c) demonstrated 
that firms with a large client base are less likely to be 
economically vulnerable to client pressures. If the quasi­
rents gained from one client make up only a minute 
percentage of a firm's revenues, that specific stream is 
likely to have much less impact on the firm than losses 
that would be suffered if several other clients changed to 
a more credible auditor. A specific governmental client 
may represent a material portion of revenues for the small 
firms that perform most municipal audits in Louisiana, 
however. In that case, the loss of client-specific 
revenues could have a big enough impact on the audit firm 
that the auditor would be more susceptible to client 
pressures to under-report breaches of laws and regulations.
Regardless of firm size, however, DeAngelo (1981a) 
notes that industry specialization may mitigate the losses 
associated with losing a particular client. If an auditor 
gains industry-specific knowledge in the course of an 
audit, knowledge carries over to other clients in the same 
industry. This specialized knowledge reduces the cost of 
future audits of other clients in that industry. Therefore
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the quasi-rents associated with a client are not completely 
lost if one client relationship is terminated over a 
disclosure dispute, as long as the auditor has other 
clients in the same industry.
Governmental auditing can be considered such an 
industry where specialized knowledge is necessary. The 
accounting principles differ from those of private sector 
businesses, and the additional auditing standards require 
auditors to be familiar with many issues not present in a 
private sector audit. Therefore even the small firms that 
perform most municipal audits can carry reduced costs from 
one client to another, diminishing the dependence on any 
particular client. This implies that small audit firms 
that specialize in governmental audits may be no more 
susceptible to pressures against independence than larger 
firms. However, small firms that do not specialize may be 
more likely to succumb to client persuasion.
Empirical Research
Several studies have relied on the theoretical 
framework described above to develop expectations about 
auditing practices and people's perceptions of auditing 
practices. Auditor independence is virtually impossible to 
measure directly, so empirical studies have had to focus 
instead on perceptions and the appearance of independence. 
Shockley (1981) surveyed CPAs, financial analysts, and loan
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officers to determine which factors were perceived as 
impairing the independence of auditors. All groups of 
subjects believed that independence would be threatened if 
the competition for audit services was high or if the audit 
firm was engaged for additional non-audit services, such as 
Management Advisory Services (MAS).
Audit firm size was significant among CPAs in the 
survey. Auditors from the then Big 8 firms perceived that 
auditors from small firms were more likely to be impaired 
than were auditors from large firms. Not surprisingly, 
however, auditors from small firms did not perceive that 
audit firm size would impact the independence of the 
auditors, nor did the financial analysts or loan officers.
Additional empirical studies have investigated which 
factors other than firm size affect financial statements 
users' perceptions of auditor independence. One factor 
which has consistently been shown to affect perceptions is 
the financial condition of the client. These studies will 
be discussed below.
Financial Condition
Knapp conducted experiments to investigate perceptions 
of auditor independence. In the first of two studies,
Knapp (1985) manipulated four factors, and loan officers 
were asked to indicate the likelihood that managers would 
obtain their preferred outcome in a dispute with the
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auditor. The subjects in the experiment perceived that 
auditors would have more difficulty resisting pressure from 
management if 1) the client was in a strong financial 
condition, 2) the conflict arose over a non-technical 
standard, 3) the audit firm also provided MAS to the 
client, and 4) the market for audit services was 
competitive.
In a similar study, Knapp (1987) asked audit committee 
members the likelihood that they would support the auditor 
in an auditor-client conflict. Two of the manipulated 
factors, financial condition of the client and technicality 
of the standard, were the same as in the 1985 study. A 
third manipulated variable was the size of the audit firm. 
Finally, the fourth variable was the type of audit 
committee member, e.g., whether the member was presently a 
corporate manager or whether he or she was either a retired 
corporate executive or from a non-business background.
Knapp found that audit committee members would support 
the auditor in conflicts in general. More specifically, 
they would be more likely to support the auditor if the 
client was in poor financial condition, if the dispute 
concerned a matter dealt with by a technical standard, or 
if the audit firm was large. Corporate managers were also 
more likely overall to support the auditors than were other 
types of audit committee members.
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Financial condition of the client was significant in 
both Knapp studies. He reasoned that if the client were in 
poor financial condition, the auditor would be more 
susceptible to legal liability if independence were judged 
to be impaired, making the auditor more resistant to client 
pressures. By contrast, if the client was financially 
healthy, auditors would believe they were less likely to be 
scrutinized or sued, making them more susceptible to 
influence by managers.
In addition, both studies indicated that the auditor 
was in a stronger position if the auditing or accounting 
standard was technical, i.e., users perceived they would be 
better able to withstand pressure and audit committee 
members were more likely to support the auditor. Knapp 
suggested that if the standard dealing with a disputed 
issue is not technical, the reporting treatment is more 
flexible; therefore auditors would be less likely to resist 
the wishes of managers. Again, this is explained as being 
due to the increased potential for legal liability of the 
auditor and the directors. A similar legal liability does 
not necessarily exist in the public sector, and in cases of 
violations of the Budget Act there is no comparable 
concern.
However, the financial condition of the municipality 
may still influence the auditor's independence. When 
municipalities experience declining revenues, past research
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has shown that citizen groups will mobilize to protect 
their interests. In a study of municipal governments 
progressing through cycles of fiscal stress and 
retrenchment, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) found 
that interest groups existing during periods of good 
financial health would strengthen coalitions and increase 
lobbying activity concerning budget allocations when 
financial health deteriorated.
If interest groups increase attention to the budget 
when the municipality is in poor financial condition, the 
financial statements, and by extension the auditor, will 
likely be under more scrutiny as well. If the auditor 
believes this to be true, he or she would be less likely to 
compromise on disclosure if the governmental client is 
experiencing fiscal stress despite the lack of legal 
liability.
Although most studies of fiscal stress vis a vis 
auditor performance have contemplated the private sector, 
Deis and Giroux (1992) considered the impact of financial 
health and other factors in a governmental context. They 
looked at quality control review papers for independent 
school districts in Texas to evaluate which factors were 
associated with lower audit quality. Audit quality, which 
was defined as the probability that discovered breaches 
would be reported, was considered to reflect auditor 
independence. Although audit quality remains only a proxy
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for independence, it may be the most direct test of 
independence possible.
Several of the factors discussed previously, including 
financial health of the client and specialization of the 
audit firm, were tested as determinants of audit quality. 
Evidence indicates that auditors did in fact reduce audit 
quality in audits of financially strong public sector 
clients. This implies that an auditor may be more inclined 
to compromise independence when the client's healthy 
condition reduces the likelihood of scrutiny or legal 
liability. Deis and Giroux (1992) also found that more 
specialized audit firms performed higher quality audits, 
lending support to DeAngelo's (1981a) theory that 
specialization of audit firms would reduce the impact of 
lost client-specific revenues, leading to increased auditor 
independence.
If fiscal stress affects auditor independence, as 
implied by the studies discussed above, it may result in 
different reporting decisions, ceteris paribus. Fiscal 
Stress is therefore included as an independent variable in 
this study. Another factor that may affect auditor 
independence stems from the political environment of a 
municipality. This issue will be discussed in the 
following section.
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Political Environment
The political environment is perhaps what most 
differentiates governmental audits from private sector 
audits. It has been argued that the political salience of 
local governments has become greater as the public 
expenditure climate has deteriorated in the last decade, 
making local elections the battleground for increasingly 
ideological economic debate (Goergen & Norpoth, 1991; 
Isaac-Henry & Painter, 1991).
Baber (1990) modelled the role of accounting 
information in the political environment. He argued that 
because voters are expected to be rationally ignorant of 
the actions of politicians and bureaucrats, accounting 
information only plays a role when political competition is 
high.
Baber (1990) maintained that competitors will enter 
into a political race only if they believe the rewards of 
office will exceed the costs of running. If most interest 
groups are affiliated with an incumbent, the cost of 
convincing them to change alliances may be too high, and 
the incumbent will be uncontested. If the costs are high, 
the political competition will be low, and the incumbent 
has no incentive to disclose his or her actions.
However, if only a narrow majority is with the 
incumbent, the costs of attaining a majority for the 
challenger are lower. If the costs to challengers are low,
49
the ability of the incumbent to maintain the majority is 
dependent upon whether pre-election actions benefitted 
interest groups in the majority coalition. According to 
Baber, if the incumbent's actions benefitted interest 
groups, he or she will win the election in a highly 
competitive race. However, if the incumbent's actions were 
not beneficial, the challenger will be able to win over a 
critical number of interest groups, winning the election.
When competition is high, therefore, interest groups 
and challengers want to monitor the actions of the 
incumbent. Accounting information provides evidence of the 
incumbent's stewardship (or lack thereof). If the 
incumbent's actions were positive, such as staying within 
the budget, he or she has an incentive to disclose it. If 
the accounting information might jeopardize the incumbent's 
future political career, he or she will try to avoid 
disclosure (Baber & Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984). Ingram 
(1984) found that accounting disclosure at the state level 
was inversely related to strength of the press, which was 
interpreted as attempts by politicians to defend themselves 
by disclosing less.
If a municipality is dealing with fiscal stress, 
politicians generally try to minimize problems, hide 
deficits, and deny responsibility for predicaments (Levine, 
Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981). Although the mandated 
financial reporting and auditing in Louisiana makes it
50
difficult to hide budgetary excesses completely, 
information may be displayed in a way to obscure rather 
than elucidate the problem (Rubin, 1990).
Public budgeting is a highly political process, and 
Rubin (1990) contends that when political actors want to 
enhance their clout, they often focus on power over the 
budget as a way to attain it. If the budget is a source of 
political power, then mismanagement of the budget could be 
a source of power erosion. Rubin (1990, 232) asserts that
. . . when governments run deficits 
because they lack internal discipline, 
or ignore or redefine the constraints 
of balance, they may be embarrassed by 
the consequences, and in the face of 
what would be widespread public 
disapproval. . . they sometimes choose 
to hide the deficits.
If the politician wishes to hide deficits, a likely 
outcome of exceeding the budget, it seems reasonable to 
expect that the politician would exert pressure against the 
auditor to minimize disclosure as well. Even if the mayor 
cannot directly control expenditures on the part of 
bureaucrats, it is the mayor who answers to the public 
through the election process. Giroux (1989, 202-203) noted 
that because "the public cannot influence the bureaucracy 
directly . . . they must work through the [elected 
officials] to change budget priorities."
When political competition is high and the budget has 
been exceeded, the auditor is likely to be pressured to
minimize disclosure. On the other hand, external forces to 
maintain independence may counteract them. If interest 
groups are scrutinizing the budget and past performance of 
the incumbent, the financial statements are a primary 
source of information. Scrutiny of the financial 
statements may correspond to increased scrutiny of the 
auditor as well. The literature has examined the motives 
of politicians regarding the budget, but there has been no 
examination of how those motives spill over to the actions 
of auditors. Therefore the political environment of the 
municipality will also be considered in this study.
The final factor to be considered in this study is the 
employment sector of the auditor. Until 1991, the Office 
of the Legislative Auditor and any private accounting firm 
could bid for local government audit engagements.1 These 
two groups of auditors may differ in both expertise in 
governmental auditing and in motivations when dealing with 
client conflict. These issues will be discussed in the 
following section.
AUDITOR EMPLOYMENT SECTOR
Auditors employed by the public sector may differ from 
those in the private sector for various reasons. Public
1 In 1991, private accounting firms successfully 
lobbied the Louisiana legislature to bar the Office of the 
Legislative Auditor from the bidding process, claiming that 
state revenue allocations provided them with an unfair 
competitive advantage.
sector auditors are specialists who work exclusively on 
governmental engagements, whereas those employed in the 
private sector are likely to have a combination of 
governmental and private sector clients. This 
specialization may lead to more expertise. A government 
employee may also have a different view of his or her role 
as an auditor and is unlikely to feel the same competitive 
pressures to maintain client relationships as is an auditor 
who depends on the good will of clients to stay in 
business. Accounting researchers have been prolific in the 
area of auditor expertise, but there has been little 
written about other qualitative factors that may differ 
between these two groups of auditors. Literature 
pertaining to auditor expertise will be discussed in this 
final section of the literature review, and inferences 
about other differences between public and private sector 
auditors will be considered as well.
Psychological research has demonstrated that 
experience increases the knowledge store of decision makers 
and affects the way in which that knowledge is organized, 
resulting in improved decision making abilities.
Behavioral accounting research has made it increasingly 
clear, however, that general experience may not be the best 
measure of knowledge or expertise.
In earlier studies knowledge was an ex post 
explanation if experience was significant in determining
53
auditor judgments; however, because results were generally 
mixed, later studies searched for other measures of 
expertise that would avoid confounding experience with 
other factors (Libby, 1991). Some of the studies that have 
found expertise differences related to experience will be 
discussed below.
Messier (1983) investigated whether experience 
affected materiality judgments. All subjects in the study 
were audit partners, but they had a wide range of 
experience. The experiment consisted of 32 cases in which 
an inventory write-down was being considered. Subjects 
were asked to rate the materiality of the write-down on a 
seven point scale and to give the probability that it 
should be disclosed on the income statement.
Five financial variables were manipulated in the 
experiment, and as in most materiality studies, the effect 
on net income explained over 75 percent of the variance in 
responses. Experience was not significant in the 
materiality ratings, but it was significant in the 
resulting reporting decisions. In addition, more 
experienced auditors demonstrated higher consensus in their 
judgments than did less experienced auditors. Under the 
standard interpretation then, the more experienced subjects 
in Messier's (1983) study demonstrated more expertise.
Frederick and Libby (1986) argued that for experienced 
auditors to demonstrate expertise, they must be asked to
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make judgments where expertise would be expected to produce 
different responses. Frederick and Libby designed an 
experiment in which subjects were asked to predict the 
financial statement implications of internal control 
weaknesses.
Errors in two pairs of accounts were reported in the 
experiment. Because of the double-entry nature of 
accounting, both pairs of errors were likely to be 
reasonable to inexperienced and experienced subjects. 
Frederick and Libby noted that only decision-makers with 
expertise in auditing could identify scenarios 
representative of internal control system weaknesses. As 
they predicted, experienced auditors were able to identify 
which internal control weaknesses would result in which 
pair of account errors whereas inexperienced auditors were 
unable to make similar assessments.
Bonner and Lewis (1990) differentiated four types of 
knowledge that may be germane to auditing tasks: general 
domain knowledge, subspecialty knowledge, world knowledge, 
and general problem solving ability. General domain 
knowledge is that gained by most people in a domain, such 
as auditing, through instruction and experience. 
Subspecialty knowledge is related to a subspecialty within 
the domain, acquired in a similar fashion, but only by 
those in that subspecialty area. World knowledge, such as 
general business knowledge, is gained from life experiences
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rather than through instruction or domain experience. 
Finally, general problem solving ability is partially 
innate and partially refined through experience.
Ashton (1991, 219) tested the effects of 
domain-specific (subspecialty) knowledge in auditor 
judgments of error frequencies. Auditors were asked to 
estimate how frequently certain accounts contained errors 
and what the most frequent causes of those errors were.
The estimates were compared to archival data to assess 
accuracy. There was no clear increase in accuracy with 
experience when auditors considered five separate 
industries. However, when auditors with experience in a 
particular industry were asked for error frequencies within 
their industry, the relationship between subspecialty 
experience and accuracy was strong. She concluded that:
audit experience should be viewed as relating to 
specific tasks rather than as a singular, 
all-encompassing concept and that particular 
experience must be understood as it relates to a 
particular type of knowledge.
Meixner and Welker (1988) conducted an experiment to 
investigate which type of experience led to expertise, as 
measured by judgment consensus. They differentiated 
situational experience, or total audit experience, from 
organizational experience, which referred to the duration 
of a subordinate's experience with a particular audit staff 
and its superior. It was argued that the reason previous
studies had found conflicting results when attempting to 
show a positive relationship between experience and 
consensus was an inappropriate definition of experience as 
situational, rather than organizational experience. A 
field experiment was performed using staff members at the 
State Auditor's Office of the State of Texas. The office 
is split into eight groups, each headed by a different 
manager. Subjects responded to 36 cases having to do with 
internal control questionnaires. The task was to assess 
strength of internal controls on a seven-point scale. The 
authors found that longer situational experience (total 
audit experience) did not result in higher consensus. In 
contrast, a significant increase in consensus was found to 
be associated with increased organizational experience. 
Tying this result into the framework of Bonner and Lewis 
(1990), total audit experience may increase general domain 
knowledge, but perhaps organizational experience is 
required to gain subspecialty knowledge.
Many of the auditors who work for the Office of the 
Legislative Auditor are employed there for their entire 
careers. Therefore, they may be more poised than private 
practitioners to gain the subspecialty knowledge required 
for governmental audits. It also seems likely that their 
long-term organizational experience would lead to higher 
consensus than would be found among less specialized 
auditors working for various organizations.
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Legislative auditors and private practitioners may 
differ on other counts as well. In a review of non- 
academic literature, Ramanan and Rubin (1989) found mixed 
arguments about the relative independence of these two 
groups. Clients may find it more difficult to pressure 
auditors who are representatives of a governmental agency 
because there is a threat that any undue pressure could be 
reported to those with authority over transfer payments.
If legislative auditors are part of an established 
bureaucracy that audits non-municipal entities as well, 
they may also be immune from market pressures to satisfy 
clients.
A private practitioner is unlikely to have either of 
these advantages over the client. However, credit analysts 
have historically placed higher value on municipal audits 
performed by private practitioners (Ramanan and Rubin,
1989). This preference may be due to perceptions of 
independence, competence, or other factors. The literature 
is not clear on this point. If private sector auditor 
integrity was a serious concern, however, this preference 
would be unlikely.
Finally, the two groups of municipal auditors may 
differ in their approaches to auditing. Kropatkin and 
Forrester (1983, 15) maintained that the goals of private 
practitioners and federal auditors are different:
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In the view of many observers, the federal 
auditor traditionally approaches a [client's] 
claims with the sole intent of looking for 
errors. Nonfederal auditors (and particularly 
public accountants) are thought to go to extremes 
to provide the grantee with a positive 
demonstration of accountability, or worse, to 
pass over issues of real significance.
Although Kropatkin and Forrester referred to federal 
auditors, it seems logical to extend the same argument to 
state auditors. In a review of belief revision studies, 
Asare and Messier (1991) noted that state auditors are 
generally predisposed toward negative evidence. However, 
in their own study, they found that the opposite was true, 
leading them to conclude that state auditor sensitivity 
toward negative evidence is shaped by the legal and 
professional environment of a particular engagement, not by 
a predisposition to expose clients.
Little research comparing the two groups of municipal 
auditors has been conducted. Perceptions of independence 
and audit goals have been debated, but empirical research 
to back up the debate is lacking. Evidence-proneness has 
been studied more scientifically, but the results have been 
conflicting and inconclusive. Ramanan and Rubin (1989) 
note that the majority of states allow either private 
practitioners or state (legislative) auditors to perform 
municipal audits. Empirical research contrasting the 
performance of these groups is needed if any conclusions
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are to be drawn as to which is better suited for such 
engagements.
SUMMARY
In order for a governmental auditor to report 
noncompliance in the compliance report, the auditor must 
view the breach as material to the financial statements.
The materiality and reporting literature is predominantly 
conducted in the private sector, where guidelines are 
fairly well established, if not specifically stated. 
Governmental guidelines are less fully developed because 
the standard reference points, such as net income and firm 
size, are absent. Research is needed into what factors 
influence an auditor's materiality judgments in 
governmental contexts.
Materiality is a concept which has traditionally been 
applied to individual account balances. Government 
auditing standards require auditors to take this concept 
into a new domain by evaluating the materiality of 
noncompliance with laws and regulations. Little research 
has investigated how the materiality concept is interpreted 
in this relatively new role for auditors.
For noncompliance to be reported, the auditor must 
view the breach as material and must be independent from 
the client. Considerable research has investigated what 
factors may impair auditor independence and how such
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impairment may affect reporting decisions. However, much 
of the reporting decision literature views reporting as 
strictly a function of materiality and not reflective of 
auditor independence. When materiality is clear-cut, 
auditor independence may not factor into the reporting 
decision. Research into reporting decisions when 
materiality is questionable may shed more light on the 
factors that impair auditor independence.
Finally, municipal audits may be conducted by two 
distinct groups of auditors. There are mixed arguments as 
to the relative independence of the legislative auditors 
and private practitioners, as well as their audit 
objectives, views of their clientele, and sensitivity 
towards positive or negative evidence. In addition to 
these issues, the results of the study by Meixner and 
Welker (1988) suggest that organizational experience may 
increase the relative expertise and consensus of 
legislative auditors.
This study is the first to consider materiality and 
reporting, independence, and experience simultaneously in 
the governmental environment. The results of this research 
should reveal materiality thresholds in governmental 
contexts, how those materiality judgments are manifested in 
reporting decisions, and whether factors that have been 
proposed as threats to auditor independence play a role in 
reporting decisions. Finally, this study will shed light
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on the differences between the two types of auditors that 
may be engaged in governmental audits.
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHOD
Compliance reporting decisions concerning the 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act are examined in this 
study. This chapter outlines the research method used. In 
the first section, the hypotheses to be tested are 
developed. In the second section, the subjects, 
experimental design, and experimental instrument are 
discussed. In the final section, the statistical tools 
used are described.
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Discovery of failure by an audit client to comply with 
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires some 
level of disclosure by the auditor. Reporting decisions 
signal the auditor's materiality judgment. In a flexible 
reporting situation, the auditor's disclosure decision may 
also reflect a balance between competing goals of client 
retention and maintaining professional integrity. Two 
research questions drive this study:
1. What level of reporting noncompliance with the 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act is selected by 
auditors?
2. What factors are associated with a lack of consensus 
in reporting decisions?
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Prior audit judgment research has analyzed cue usage 
in the framework of developing linear models of auditors' 
decisions (e.g., Ashton, 1974; Ashton and Brown, 1980; and 
Hamilton and Wright, 1982) . While many factors potentially 
affect the compliance reporting decision, this study 
considers budget variance, fiscal stress, political 
environment, and employment sector. Hypotheses concerning 
these factors are developed below.
Budget Variance
Government Auditing Standards (GAS) require material 
noncompliance with laws and regulations to be reported. In 
reality, noncompliance with the Budget Act does not have 
any material impact on the financial statements. 
Noncompliance will not cause a municipality to lose its 
future funding or force it to refund taxes. The only legal 
recourse available to citizens is to obtain an injunction 
against further extra-budgeted expenditures. At issue is 
the materiality or significance of the violation in its own 
right.1
1 The Yellow Book defines significance as, "the 
importance, in relation to the audit objectives, of an item 
event, information, or matter, or of a problem the auditor 
identifies." This is somewhat different from materiality, 
which in the Yellow Book is defined as, "the magnitude of 
an omission or misstatement of accounting information that 
... makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable 
person relying on the information would have been changed 
or influenced by the omission or misstatement." (GAO, 1988, 
G-8)
Effects on net income have been the major determinant 
of materiality thresholds found in private sector research 
(Holstrum and Messier, 1982). There is no analogous figure 
in governmental accounting, but revenues and expenses are 
addressed in the budget. Therefore, unfavorable variance 
from the budgeted expenditures may serve as a materiality 
guideline for auditors. If this is the case, auditors may 
have similar thresholds for budget variance as they do for 
effect on net income. Low budget variance may be viewed 
similarly to a low impact on net income, leading the 
auditor to judge noncompliance as nonmaterial, whereas high 
budget variance may be considered material noncompliance.
Budget variance below five percent is not a violation 
of the Budget Act and requires no reporting. Expenditures 
in excess of the budget by more than five percent represent 
noncompliance and require the auditor to evaluate the 
reporting options. Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler (1989) 
found that opinions were modified more frequently when 
changes in accounting principle had a high impact on net 
income. If budget variance is great, governmental auditors 
may similarly believe that a high order of disclosure is 
appropriate. If the auditor believes that noncompliance 
with the Budget Act is significant regardless of the dollar 
impact, the auditor may report budget variance at any level 
over five percent in the compliance report. In either 
case, higher levels of budget variance are expected to
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result in higher levels of noncompliance reporting. This 
leads to the first hypothesis:
Hl0: The percentage variance from the budget will not
affect the reporting decision.
H1a: Higher percentages of unfavorable budget variance will 
result in higher level noncompliance reporting.
As in prior research (e.g. Boatsman and Robertson, 
1974; Stephens, 1983; and Chewning, Pany, and Wheeler,
1989), reporting decisions are examined in this study for 
their insight into auditor materiality judgments. A second 
line of audit research has examined factors that may impair 
auditor independence, thus affecting reporting decisions. 
Two such factors considered in this study are fiscal stress 
and political environment. The impact these two factors 
are expected to have on compliance reporting decisions will 
be discussed below.
Fiscal Stress
Prior research has shown that auditors are perceived 
to be better able to maintain their independence from 
clients when the auditee is in poor financial condition 
(Knapp, 1985), and that audit committee members are more 
likely to support the auditor should a conflict arise with 
a client in such a situation (Knapp, 1987). This has been 
explained as being due to the increased potential for legal 
liability of the auditor and the directors.
Although there are no analogous legal ramifications 
for the auditor for failing to disclose a violation of the 
Budget Act, an auditor may still be expected to avoid the 
appearance of impaired independence for financially 
troubled governmental clients. When municipalities 
experience declining revenues, past research has shown that 
citizen groups actively protect their interests (Levine, 
Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981). In situations of fiscal 
stress, the auditor and/or the municipal government likely 
will be under more scrutiny than if the municipality is in 
a healthy financial condition.
Heightened public scrutiny could endanger the 
auditor's professional reputation if instances of 
noncompliance are not reported. Therefore the auditor must 
choose higher level reporting options (e.g., compliance 
report or opinion) to maintain a good professional 
reputation. However, if fiscal stress is absent, scrutiny 
can be expected to be lower. In this case, the auditor's 
professional reputation is not necessarily as endangered, 
and thus a lower level of disclosure may be used.
Empirical evidence has shown that audits of financially 
strong public sector clients are lower in quality (Deis and 
Giroux, 1992). If auditors are more inclined to compromise 
their independence when the client's healthy condition 
reduces the likelihood of scrutiny, lower quality audits 
may result and reporting levels may be reduced:
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H20: Fiscal stress will not affect the auditor's reporting
decision.
H2a: High (low) fiscal stress will be associated with a 
higher (lower) level of noncompliance reporting.
Political Environment
The political environment differentiates governmental 
audits from private sector audits. As the primary document 
in determining the economic activity of a municipality, the 
budget is a logical subject of political debate. Factors 
that affect the salience of the budget, such as political 
competition, may therefore affect the seriousness with 
which auditors view violations of the Budget Act or the 
likelihood they will compromise their independence.
Baber (1990) noted that elected officials use audited 
accounting information to communicate their actions, 
leading to increased political sensitivity of the budget. 
The use of accounting information depends on the level of 
political competition. When political competition is high, 
incumbents benefit from increased accounting disclosures 
only if their actions have benefitted constituents (Baber,
1990). When political competition is low, disclosure of 
past activities is unlikely to affect the outcomes of 
future elections, and the incumbent has little incentive 
for disclosure (Baber & Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984).
By contrast, newly elected politicians have no 
incentive to resist disclosure of budgetary problems.
Goergen and Norpoth (1991) found that the public seems to 
grant a newly elected official a "popularity credit" during 
the first year of office. During this period, the public 
is more receptive to the argument that any problems are the 
fault of the previous administration, particularly when 
considering economic outcomes. Therefore, newly elected 
officials tend to disclose or publicize any economic 
difficulties, such as over-expenditures, as soon as 
possible. Disclosure promotes the perception of the new 
official as an honest one who inherited a bad situation 
rather than as one who caused it or tried to hide it 
(Goergen and Norpoth, 1991).
If a governmental auditor finds noncompliance with the 
Budget Act in the first audit after a new mayor has been 
elected in a highly competitive race, a higher order of 
reporting can be expected. The new mayor can blame any 
budgetary problems on the previous administration during 
the "popularity credit" period, and is unlikely to resist 
disclosure. Therefore, a high level of reporting allows 
the auditor to maintain professional integrity without 
jeopardizing the auditor-client relationship.
By contrast, if the mayor is an incumbent in a 
noncompetitive political environment, he or she will try to 
hide problems such as deficits and mismanagement (Rubin,
1990). Conflict would likely result if an auditor 
suggested reporting noncompliance with the Budget Act
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within the financial statements. Pressure from the 
incumbent could lead the auditor to compromise independence 
in order to maintain the client relationship. Therefore a 
lower level of reporting is expected if the mayor is an 
incumbent than if political turnover in a highly 
competitive election has occurred:
H30: Political turnover will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H3a: Political turnover will be associated with a higher 
level of noncompliance reporting.
Employment Sector
Currently, only private audit firms perform local 
government audits in Louisiana, but until July, 1991, such 
audits could be performed either by private practitioners 
or by staff members of the Legislative Auditor's Office. 
These two groups are likely to be fundamentally different, 
both in governmental auditing experience and approaches to 
compliance reporting judgments. Accounting researchers 
have investigated the link between work experience and 
audit judgments with mixed results.2 Bonner and Lewis 
(1990, 3) discuss the findings of prior accounting research 
and suggest that researchers consider knowledge needed to
2 See for example Ashton and Brown (1980), Hamilton 
and Wright (1982), Messier (1983), Butler (1986), Frederick 
and Libby (1986), Biggs, Mock, and Watkins (1988), Meixner 
and Welker (1988), Kaplan and Reckers (1989), and Libby 
(1991).
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complete tasks and, "not assume that all persons at a given 
level of experience equally possess task-specific 
knowledge."
Ashton (1991, 219) tested the effects of subspecialty 
knowledge in auditor judgments of error frequencies. She 
found a significant relationship between subspecialty 
experience and judgment accuracy but no relationship 
between general auditing experience and accuracy. Her 
findings suggest that if experience is to be used as a 
proxy for expertise, subspecialty experience is most 
relevant.
Legislative auditors work exclusively on governmental 
engagements, which gives them more subspecialty experience 
than their private practitioner counterparts. Bonner and 
Lewis (1990) suggest that this should lead to differences 
in subspecialty knowledge, which may result in the adoption 
of different disclosure choices. Kropatkin and Forrester 
(1983) noted that whereas auditors employed by the 
government are perceived as seeking out problems, private 
practitioners are perceived as enabling the client to look 
as good as possible, suggesting that private practitioners 
would be expected to report noncompliance at a lower level 
than legislative auditors:
H40: Group membership will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
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H4a: Legislative auditors will use higher levels of 
noncompliance reporting than will private 
practitioners.
Another element that may lead to expected differences 
between these two groups could be a different approach to 
violations of the Budget Act and compliance reporting in 
general. The legislative audit group is trained to be 
particularly sensitive to noncompliance, and an internal 
memo to the legislative audit staff from the Policy and 
Quality Assurance Department specifically highlighted 
noncompliance with the Budget Act as a significant 
finding.3 Therefore, at any level above five percent 
variance the legislative audit group is expected to 
disclose noncompliance at the compliance report level. 
However, private practitioners may not be sensitized to the 
Budget Act and may judge violations with respect to 
materiality thresholds.
If private practitioners make materiality judgments, 
but legislative auditors simply judge compliance itself, 
the following reporting decisions would be expected: if
3 The memo provided illustrations of material 
noncompliance, findings that were not material but were 
significant, and nonmaterial noncompliance. Unfavorable 
budget variance of over five percent was cited as a 
significant violation of the Budget Act. The memo further 
stated that all instances of material or significant 
noncompliance were to be reported in the compliance report. 
Because this study took place ten months after the memo was 
circulated, however, it was not expected that auditors 
would automatically recall the directive.
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the budget variance did not exceed the five percent limit, 
neither group would report noncompliance. If variance was 
in excess of traditional materiality thresholds, both 
groups would report noncompliance on the compliance report. 
However, if the variance is marginally above the limit, 
legislative auditors would report on the compliance report, 
whereas private practitioners may judge the violation as 
nonmaterial and report at a lower level or not at all:
H4b: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with budget variance in determining the level of 
noncompliance reporting.
Most of the legislative audit staff have had little 
experience as private practitioners. As members of a large 
staff supported by state funds, they are generally immune 
from any financial ramifications of losing a client.
Private practitioners, on the other hand, must be concerned 
about the viability of their practice if they sacrifice 
client-specific revenues. Shockley (1982) noted that when 
auditors rely on good will from clients to stay in 
business, it can be difficult for them to remain 
independent.
For large firms, client-specific revenues are likely 
to be a small enough portion of total revenues that the 
auditor can maintain independence. Small firms, such as 
those engaged for most municipal audits, are less likely to 
be able to withstand the loss of a particular client,
however, and may be more likely to compromise under client 
pressure (DeAngelo, 1981c). Therefore the fiscal stress 
and political turnover factors discussed previously, that 
may increase pressure on auditors to compromise their 
independence, may only affect the private practitioners. 
Therefore the legislative audit group is expected to 
respond predominantly to the budget variance, whereas the 
private practitioner group may consider other contextual 
factors as well:
H4C: Group membership will have a significant interaction 
with fiscal stress in determining the level of 
noncompliance reporting.
H4d: Group membership will have a significant interaction 
with political turnover in determining the level of 
noncompliance reporting.
Finally, legislative auditors work only in the field 
of governmental auditing, while private practitioners have 
a mix of governmental and non-governmental clients. 
Legislative auditors should therefore develop more 
specialized knowledge of governmental auditing. In the 
absence of correct responses, consensus is considered to be 
useful for demonstrating expertise (Dirsmith, Covaleski, 
and McAllister, 1985). Therefore, if subspecialty 
experience leads to increased subspecialty knowledge as 
Ashton (1991) and Bonner and Lewis (1990) suggest, 
legislative auditors should show higher consensus in their 
reporting decisions.
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Meixner and Welker (1988) found that general auditing 
experience did not explain consensus, but organizational 
experience was a significant determinant of consensus.
This finding concurs with Ashton's (1991) findings that 
expertise increased with subspecialty experience. In 
addition, because the legislative audit staff receives 
similar training and is under one administration, their 
disclosure decisions are likely to be more uniform than 
those of private practitioners working in various small 
firms. Therefore legislative auditors are expected to 
demonstrate higher consensus than are private 
practitioners:
H4e: Legislative auditors will show higher consensus in
noncompliance reporting than will private 
practitioners.
The research hypotheses were tested in a quasi-experiment. 
The model and the experimental procedure are described in 
the following section.
METHODOLOGY
Noncompliance reporting decisions in a municipal 
financial statement audit are the focus of this study. The 
particular law considered is the Louisiana Local Government 
Budget Act, with which all municipalities or other 
political subdivisions of the state must comply. The 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act was first implemented
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in 1980 and last revised in 1984. The Budget Act is also 
among the state laws specifically emphasized in the 
Louisiana Governmental Audit Guide (Society of Louisiana 
Certified Public Accountants, 1989) , thus is considered a 
law with which municipal administrators and governmental 
auditors should be familiar.
In particular, the Budget Act requires municipalities 
to adopt a budget amendment if expenditures exceed the 
original budget by more than five percent (LSA-RS 
39:1309-1310). Therefore, if budget variance is greater 
than five percent, and no amendment is adopted, the 
governmental entity does not comply with the Budget Act.
The hypotheses outlined above were tested in the 
context of the Budget Act using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3  
quasi-experimental design. The model tested is as follows: 
RD = f(BV, FS, PT, G, G X BV, G X FS, G X PT) 
where RD = Reporting Decision (6 levels)
BV = Budget Variance (3 levels)
FS = Fiscal Stress (2 levels)
PT = Political Turnover (2 levels)
G = Group (2 groups)
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the experiment was the 
Reporting Decision (RD). The auditors had the following 
six options in reporting:
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1. No communication
2. Oral communication with management
3. Management letter
4. Footnote disclosure
5. Compliance report
6. Financial statement report (Opinion)
This variable was treated as ordinal in nature. If 
the auditor indicated that no communication would be made, 
RD was assigned a score of 0, oral communication was 
assigned a score of 1, and so on. As discussed in Chapter 
1, GAS do not signify a hierarchical differentiation 
between the compliance report and the opinion, hence either 
report was assigned a score of 4.
Independent Variables
The first independent variable, unfavorable Budget 
Variance (BV), was manipulated at three levels: four,
seven, and sixteen percent. Four percent is not in 
violation of the Budget Act, and therefore no reporting is 
required. Certainly the possibility exists that some 
"zealous" auditors will report any variance with the 
budget, at least in a management letter, regardless of 
legal requirements. The higher budget variance levels, 
seven and sixteen percent, indicate different degrees of 
noncompliance with the Budget Act. In materiality studies 
that have concentrated on private sector audits, anything 
less than four percent of net income has been nonmaterial, 
and anything greater than ten percent has always been
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material. Results have been unclear as to where, in the 
four to ten percent range, the materiality threshold has 
been (Holstrum and Messier, 1982).
Although there is no precise equivalent to net income 
in governmental entities, the budget likewise concerns 
revenues and expenditures. Therefore a seven percent 
budget variance may fall in the area which may or may not 
be considered material, allowing the auditor some 
flexibility in disclosing noncompliance. The auditor may 
strike a balance between independence and client retention 
by choosing a lower level of disclosure. Sixteen percent, 
by contrast, is over the traditional maximum materiality 
thresholds and is likely to be considered material by all 
subjects. Seven and sixteen percent are also likely to be 
considered realistic by the subjects; a preliminary study 
of financial reports of Louisiana municipalities showed 
that actual budget variances of these levels were quite 
common. Significance of this variable in the model would 
support Hypothesis 1A.
The second independent variable is Fiscal Stress (FS). 
Various measures have been proposed to alert accountants, 
public administrators, and financial statement users of 
current or impending fiscal stress. Suggested measures 
have included credit default, insolvency, negative fund 
balances, negative cash flows, and particular patterns of 
revenue decline (Rosenberg & Stallings, 1978; Copeland &
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Ingram, 1983; Wallace, 1985; Apostolou, Giroux, & Welker, 
1985; and Mattson & Twogood, 1991). Declining revenue is 
perhaps the most relevant of these measures in considering 
the Budget Act. Without some contextual information, 
however, such trends may not be sufficient to signal fiscal 
stress; municipalities may draw down accumulated fund 
balances deliberately in an effort to avoid raising taxes. 
If the revenue trend can be linked to an environmental or 
economic change, however, fiscal stress may be more clearly 
indicated.
Therefore, high fiscal stress was indicated by a
serious erosion in the local tax base, caused by the
closure of a plant that was a major employer in the area. 
The low fiscal stress condition indicated that employment 
levels and property values were expected to be stable in 
the foreseeable future. Significance of this variable in
the model would support Hypothesis 2A.
The third independent variable is Political Turnover 
(PT). This variable is used to indicate the political 
environment. In the turnover condition, cases stated that 
the municipality had a new mayor in the current year 
following a highly competitive election in which the 
incumbent was defeated. The no-turnover condition stated 
that the mayor was a popular incumbent serving a third 
term. If political turnover was found to be significant, 
Hypothesis 3A would be supported.
Each of the first three independent variables was 
manipulated within subjects. The fourth independent 
variable, Employment Group (G), is by necessity a between 
subjects variable. The two groups are private 
practitioners and legislative audit staff. Significance of 
G would lend support to Hypothesis 4A. Hypothesis 4B 
posited that legislative auditors may report any 
noncompliance at the highest level whereas private sector 
auditors may differentiate between the two levels of 
noncompliance. This hypothesis is tested by including the 
(BVxG) interaction in the model. The next two hypotheses 
stated the expectation that only private sector auditors 
would consider fiscal stress and political turnover in 
making their reporting decisions. Therefore, significance 
of the interaction terms (GxFS) and (GxPT) would support 
Hypotheses 4C and 4D, respectively.
Subjects
The subjects for the experiment were auditors either 
in the private sector or working for the Office of the 
Legislative Auditor of Louisiana. Both groups have 
experience in compliance auditing. The auditors in the 
private sector were selected from a list, provided by the 
Legislative Auditor, of auditors who had been contracted by 
municipalities or other political subdivisions of the state 
of Louisiana to perform financial and compliance audits
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within the previous two years. The auditors from the 
Legislative Auditor's Office were selected from all branch 
offices and from a range of experience levels. A weakness 
in the study is that the subjects were not randomly 
selected, so inferences beyond the subject groups must be 
made with caution.
Procedure
The experimental task was conducted through the mail, 
with a letter enclosed from the Legislative Auditor 
encouraging participation in the experiment. This letter 
was included to increase the response rate.
The subjects received an experimental instrument that 
began with a short explanation of the task. Cases involved 
the fictional small town of Pemberton, Louisiana. The 
auditors were instructed that they had been engaged for an 
audit of Pemberton in accordance with Government Auditing 
Standards. A list of conditions possible for each case was 
also presented with the instructions. Finally, the 
introduction to the experiment included a condensed outline 
of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Cases provided the percentage of budget variance as 
well as information about the financial status and 
political profile of the municipality. Each subject 
received sixteen cases; twelve cases were required to 
provide all possible combinations of the within-subjects
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variables, and following Ashton (1974) and Meixner and 
Welker (1988), four cases were duplicated to evaluate 
test-retest reliability. After reading the case 
descriptions, subjects were asked where, if anywhere, they 
would report noncompliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act. Three sample cases, as well as all 
introductory materials, are illustrated in the Appendix.
Subjects were asked for certain demographic variables 
including the number of CPE credits in governmental audits 
they had earned and whether they had received the AICPA 
Governmental Accounting and Auditing Certificate of 
Educational Achievement (GAACEA). These data are used to 
describe the sample and in an effort to capture additional 
expertise elements affecting the decision process.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Data gathered in the experiment were analyzed in an 
ordinal probit model. Ordinary probit and logistic 
regression models do not account for the ordinal nature of 
the reporting decision variable, and regression treats all 
intervals as equal. However, ordinal probit analysis was 
designed for use when a categorical dependent variable is 
inherently ordered (McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975).4
4 Accounting researchers have used ordinal probit to 
model bond rating reactions to pension variables (Maher, 
1987), corporate reactions to the proposed introduction of 
current cost accounting (Sutton, 1988), and accounting 
choices that alter net income (Press and Weintrop, 1990) .
Ordinal probit assumes that the dependent variable is 
a linear function of the independent variables, such that:
Y = X/3 + u, where (? is a vector of parameters and u is a
random disturbance. The error term is assumed to be
normally distributed and independent. To mitigate
violations of the independence assumption, the cases were 
administered in random order, with the constraint that the 
four repeated cases were last, and the first repeated case 
did not directly follow the initial presentation of that 
case. The order of the within-subjects variables was also 
randomized within the individual cases.
Y, the interval dependent variable of the true model, 
is unobservable. Only Z, which is an ordinal version of Y, 
with M response categories can be observed. In this study, 
Z is the observable reporting decision, with five 
categories. The five categories represent intervals on the 
real line, bounded by three thresholds, /jf such that if:
Yi < 0 then Z i = 0; RD = no report
0 < Yi < Mi then Z; = l; RD = oral communication
Mi < Yj < m2 then N II CO RD = management letter
m2 < Yi < m3 then Zj = 3; RD = footnotes
m3 < Yi then II
n" RD = compliance report or
Maximum likelihood estimators are used to estimate the 
parameters (3 and thresholds //;. Chi-square tests will be 
used to further test the model and describe the results. 
Finally, consensus within groups will be analyzed using
Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients. 
Coefficients for all possible pairs of subjects will be 
computed. The overall mean correlation coefficient will be 
computed, as will the mean correlation coefficients for 
each of the two groups.
Hypothesis 4E posited that, because of subspecialty 
expertise and relatively uniform managerial influence, 
there would be a higher degree of consensus within the 
Legislative Audit group than within the private practice 
group or all auditors considered together. A two-sample t- 
test contrasting the mean correlation coefficients of the 
employment sector groups is used to test the final 
hypothesis.
CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the 
experiment described in the previous chapter. The data 
will be characterized first with chi-square tests and then 
with results of the ordinal probit analysis. Empirical 
results will be compared to the research expectations.
SUBJECTS 
Legislative Auditors
Fifty experimental instruments were sent to staff 
members of the Office of the Legislative Auditor. Subjects 
were selected by an audit manager who served as a liaison 
during this study. These subjects were selected on a non- 
random basis such that the group of subjects would have a 
range of experience in compliance auditing, would contain 
representatives from each of the three major offices of the 
Legislative Auditor around the state, and would be 
available and presumed willing to participate.
Of the fifty instruments, 4 5 were returned completed. 
Nonresponding subjects were sent up to three letters urging 
their participation in an effort to increase the response 
rate. Each experiment contained twelve cases plus four 
repeated cases to check for consistency. Responses were 
deemed unusable if the reporting decision on more than one
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of the repeated cases was inconsistent. One legislative 
auditor's response was deemed unusable by the above 
consistency criterion, but the remaining 44 responses were 
usable. This represents a usable response rate of 88% for 
this group.
Legislative auditors had an average of 14.8 years of 
accounting experience, with 12.4 years of governmental 
auditing experience. Twenty-four of the 44 legislative 
audit subjects were Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), 
one of whom had earned the Governmental Accounting and 
Auditing Certificate of Educational Achievement (GAACEA). 
Finally, legislative auditors had received an average of 57 
hours of Continuing Professional Education (CPE) in the two 
years prior to the study. Most of the CPE for these 
subjects was provided internally, with CPAs and non-CPAs 
being instructed jointly.
Private Practitioners
Fifty experimental instruments were sent to private 
practitioners experienced in governmental audits. These 
subjects did not necessarily operate their own private 
practices; rather, all worked in the private sector for 
firms which engaged in governmental auditing. Subjects 
from the private sector were selected from a list, provided 
by the Office of the Legislative Auditor, of audit firms
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that had been engaged for municipal audits in the two years 
prior to the experiment.
Firms were selected on a non-random basis such that 
auditors from all parts of the state and from different 
size firms would be included in the sample. Individual 
subjects were solicited over the telephone. In some 
instances, the contact person was willing to provide names 
of other subjects. In many cases, contact persons 
requested that they be sent multiple instruments which they 
would distribute to others in their firms.
Of the fifty experiments sent, twenty-nine were 
completed and returned. One of the responses was deemed 
unusable by the consistency criterion, representing a 
usable response rate of 56%.1 Nonresponding subjects 
received two follow-up letters as well as an additional 
phone call to elicit participation, but the response rate 
for this group remained lower than that of the legislative 
audit group.
1 It appears likely that several of the instruments 
were not distributed to potential subjects. To illustrate, 
one contact person at a larger firm agreed to participate 
and volunteered to distribute instruments to four 
colleagues within the firm. None of these five was 
returned. It seems reasonable to assume that the contact 
person did not distribute the experiments, and therefore 
only the contact person should be considered a non­
respondent. Of the fifty experiments, it appears likely 
that eleven were never distributed. Therefore, if the 
response rate is adjusted for the likelihood that only 39 
experiments reached the intended recipients, the usable 
response rate for this group was 72%.
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Private practitioners participating in the study had 
an average of 14 years of accounting experience, with 10.8 
years of experience in governmental auditing. Although 
there was no significant difference in total experience 
between the two groups of subjects, legislative auditors 
had significantly more governmental audit experience.
These results are illustrated in Table 4.1. Private 
practitioners had earned less CPE credits, but the 
difference was not significant. Finally, 27 of the 28 
private practitioners were CPAs, and 18 had earned the 
GAACEA.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3 were tested in 
the context of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act 
using a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3  quasi-experimental design.
Incomplete responses were included in the analysis, but the 
four repeated cases were excluded. If a subject was 
inconsistent on one case, the response to that case was 
eliminated from the analysis. If the subject was 
inconsistent on more than one repeated case, the entire 
instrument was deemed unusable, as discussed above. 
Responses used in the analysis totalled 844, with 514 from 
legislative auditor subjects and the remaining 330 from 
private practitioners. Data were analyzed using frequency 
tables and ordinal probit analysis.
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Table 4.1
Experience and Certification of Subjects
All Subjects Legislative
Auditors
Private
Practitioners
Experience Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
Total
Accounting
Experience1
14.5 1-34 14.8 1-34 14.0 2-28
Governmental
Auditing
Experience3*
11.7 1-28 12.4 1-23 10.8 2-28
Continuing
Professional
Education15
55.3 0-250 57. 0 0-120 52.6 18-250
Certification Earned
Legislative
Auditors
Private
Practitioners
Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA)*
24 27
Non-CPA* 20 1
Governmental Accounting 
and Auditing Certificate 
of Achievement (GAACEA)*
1 18
Non-GAACEA* 43 10
0 Experience variables measured in years.
b Continuing Professional Education is measured in hours in prior 24 
months.
Legislative Auditors differ significantly from Private Practitioners.
For each case, subjects were asked where they would 
report noncompliance with the Louisiana Local Government 
Budget Act. Subjects were instructed to select as many 
reporting options as applied (see Appendix). For the 
purpose of this analysis, the reporting decision variable 
was coded with the highest level of reporting circled by
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the subject for that case. For example, if compliance 
report and management letter were both circled, the 
reporting decision would be coded as a compliance report. 
Subjects' reporting decisions are summarized in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 
Reporting Decisions
Reporting Decision Frequency Percentage
No Report Made 206 24.4 %
Oral Communication 49 5.8 %
Management Letter 54 6.4 %
Footnotes 23 2.7 %
Compliance Report 
or Opinion
512 60.7 %
Total 844 100.0 %
As Table 4.2 illustrates, responses were grouped 
primarily on the two ends of the reporting scale, with only 
14.9% falling between no reporting and the highest level of 
reporting available. This study has suggested that four 
variables may influence which of the available reporting 
options an auditor chooses. Hypotheses involving budget 
variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment 
sector were developed in Chapter 3. The evidence 
concerning each of these variables will be described 
separately below, using frequency tables and chi-square
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tests. The ordinal probit analysis will then be discussed, 
followed by additional descriptive analysis of the data.
Frequency Tables
Budget Variance
The first research hypothesis, which concerned budget 
variance, was as follows:
Hl0: The percentage variance from the budget will not
affect the reporting decision.
H1a: Higher percentages of unfavorable budget variance will 
result in higher level noncompliance reporting.
Reporting decisions made by auditors at each budget 
variance level are illustrated in Table 4.3. The chi- 
square test is highly significant (p < .01), indicating a 
strong relationship between budget variance and reporting 
decision.2 For example, when budget variance was four 
percent, representing municipal compliance with the Budget 
Act, 72.5% of the responses indicated that no report should 
be made. However, when the municipality failed to comply 
with the Budget Act, all responses indicated some level of 
reporting. The reporting level was significantly higher 
for the sixteen percent budget variance cases than for the 
seven percent cases as well (x23 = 13 . 054, p < .01). These 
results support the first research hypothesis.
2 Chi-square tests of the data in this experiment were 
performed using SAS software, version 6.2, ® 1990, SAS 
Institute.
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Table 4.3
Reporting Decisions by Budget Variance Level
Number of Responses 
Column Percentage 4 % 7 % 16 %
No Report Made 206 0 0
72.5 % 0 % 0 %
Oral Communication 39 6 4
13.7 % 2.1 % 1.4 %
Management Letter 18 28 8
6.3 % 10.0 % 2.9 %
Footnotes 13 6 4
4.6 % 2.1 % 1.4 %
Compliance Report 8 240 264
or Opinion 2.8 % 85.7 % 94.3 %
Total Responses 284 280 280
X28 = 707.26 (p < .01)
Fiscal Stress
The second research hypothesis involved fiscal stress. 
Deis and Giroux (1992) found that audit quality was 
higher,and Knapp's (1985, 1987) studies implied that 
auditors were less likely to be pressured into 
underreporting, when fiscal stress was present. The 
findings of these studies led to the second research 
hypothesis:
H20: Fiscal stress will not affect the auditor's reporting
decision.
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H2a: High (low) fiscal stress will be associated with a 
higher (lower) level of noncompliance reporting.
Table 4.4 provides the reporting decisions made at 
each level of fiscal stress. The chi-square statistic is 
not significant, indicating that there was no relationship 
between fiscal stress and the compliance reporting 
decision, thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Table 4.4
Reporting Decisions by Fiscal Stress Level
Number of Responses No High
Column Percentage Fiscal Stress Fiscal Stress
No Report Made 107 99
25.5 % 23.3 %
Oral Communication 20 29
4.8 % 6.8 %
Management Letter 28 26
6.7 % 6.1 %
Footnotes 10 13
2.4 % 3.1 %
Compliance Report 254 258
or Opinion 60.6 % 60.7 %
Total Responses 419 425
X24 = 2.42 (p > .10)
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Political Turnover
The third research hypothesis considered the impact of 
political turnover on auditors' reporting decisions. 
Political turnover was chosen as an indicator of the 
political environment, because it was believed that an 
incumbent mayor would be more likely to resist disclosure 
than someone who had just entered office after a 
competitive election. This led to the third research 
hypothesis:
H30: Political turnover will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H3a: Political turnover will be associated with a higher 
level of noncompliance reporting.
Reporting decisions at each level of political 
turnover are shown in Table 4.5. As with fiscal stress, 
the chi-cguare test did not indicate any relationship 
between political turnover and auditor reporting decisions. 
Again, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Employment Sector
Subjects in the experiment were either private 
practitioners or legislative auditors. Kropatkin and 
Forrester (1983) noted that private sector auditors are 
perceived to be client advocates whereas federal auditors
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Table 4.5
Reporting Decisions by Political Turnover
Number of Responses Incumbent Political
Column Percentage Mayor Turnover
No Report Made 104 102
25.5 % 24.3 %
Oral Communication 27 22
6.4 % 5.2 %
Management Letter 27 27
6.4 % 6.4 %
Footnotes 10 13
2.4 % 3.1 %
Compliance Report 256 256
or Opinion 60.4 % 61.0 %
Total Responses 424 420
X24 — 0.90 (p > .10)
are perceived to seek out problems for disclosure. If this 
perception is correct, legislative auditors should be 
expected to report noncompliance at higher levels:
H40: Group membership will not affect the auditor's
reporting decision.
H4a: Legislative auditors will use higher levels of
noncompliance reporting than will private 
practitioners.
Reporting decisions of the two groups of auditors are 
depicted in Table 4.6. There is a highly significant 
relationship between employment sector of the subjects and 
reporting decisions (p < .01). This result supports
hypothesis H4A. Additional hypotheses concerning 
employment sector will be considered in the discussion of 
the ordinal probit model.
Table 4.6
Reporting Decisions by Employment Sector
Number of Responses Legislative Private
Column Percentage Auditors Practitioners
No Report Made 125 81
24.3 % 24.6 %
Oral Communication 31 18
6.0 % 5.5 %
Management Letter 18 36
3.5 % 10.9 %
Footnotes 9 14
1.8 % 4.2 %
Compliance Report 331 181
or Opinion 64.4 % 54.9 %
Total Responses 514 330
X24 = 24.95 (p < .01) 
Ordinal Probit Analysis
The chi-square analysis in the previous section 
established that a relationship existed between reporting 
decisions and budget variance as well as employment sector. 
However, a complete model of the compliance reporting 
decisions is needed to test these relationships 
simultaneously as well as to test the interactions between
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employment sector and the remaining variables. The model 
to be tested is as follows3:
RD = f (BV, FS, PT, 6/ 6 X BV, G X FS, G X PT)
where RD = Reporting Decision (6 levels)
BV = Budget Variance (3 levels)
FS = Fiscal Stress (2 levels)
PT = Political Turnover (2 levels)
G = Group / Employment Sector (2 groups)
The full model was tested using ordinal probit 
analysis, which estimates a linear model for an ordered 
categorical dependent variable (McKelvey and Zavoina,
1975). Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients 
for each variable, as well as for the threshold parameters, 
/zj, were obtained. The results are presented in Table 4.7.
A chi-square test statistic is computed from the log 
likelihood ratio to test the significance of the overall 
model, and t-ratios are used to test the significance of 
individual parameters. The overall model is highly 
significant. Specifically, the ordinal probit results 
concur with the results of the frequency tables, in that 
budget variance and employment sector are found to be
3 Ordinal probit analysis of the model was performed 
using LIMDEP software, ® 1991, William Greene, Econometric 
Software, Inc.
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Table 4.7
Ordinal Probit of Reporting Decision on Budget Variance, 
Fiscal Stress, Political Turnover, Employment Sector, 
and Employment Sector Interactions
Variable Coefficient t - ratio
Intercept - 4.978 - 14.155**
Budget Variance 1.065 16.184**
Fiscal Stress 0.167 0.985
Political Turnover - 0.004 - 0.025
Employment Sector 4 . 069 10. 318**
Employment Sector x 
Budget Variance
- 0.833 — 12.801**
Employment Sector x 
Fiscal Stress
- 0.094 — 0. 429
Employment Sector x 
Political Turnover
0.046 0. 208
Mi 0.378 6.766**
M2 0.827 10. 169**
Ms 1.013 10.614**
X27 = 679.09** *» p < . 01
significant determinants of reporting decisions while
fiscal stress and political turnover are not.
Legislative auditors reported violations of the Budget 
Act at a higher level than did private practitioners. This 
finding supports the perception that legislative auditors 
disclose noncompliance more readily, but it also suggests 
that they may consider noncompliance with the Budget Act 
significant at any level, whereas private practitioners 
judge the materiality of the noncompliance in making a
reporting decision. If so, the two groups would respond to 
the budget variance factor differently. In addition, 
legislative auditors should be unaffected by other 
variables such as fiscal stress and political turnover. By 
contrast, private practitioners may consider these factors 
because of pressures that would be brought to bear against 
them in client conflict situations. The following 
hypotheses reflect these expectations:
H4b: Group membership will have a significant interaction
with budget variance in determining the level of 
noncompliance reporting.
H4C: Fiscal stress will affect the level of noncompliance
reporting for private practitioners but not for 
legislative auditors.
H4d: Political turnover will affect the level of
noncompliance reporting for private practitioners but 
not for legislative auditors.
In the ordinal probit model, the employment sector x 
budget variance interaction is significant. This supports 
Hypothesis 4B. However, the employment sector interactions 
with fiscal stress and political turnover are not 
significant, and therefore Hypotheses 4C and 4D are not 
supported. Fiscal stress and political turnover were 
expected to impact the reporting decision because of the 
implications for auditor independence. The fact that 
neither was significant, alone or in conjunction with 
employment sector, implies that the auditors did not 
consider the pressures against them or believed such
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pressures would not affect their reporting decisions. The 
significance of the budget variance x employment sector 
interaction, however, adds additional support to the notion 
that legislative auditors and private practitioners have 
different approaches to reporting noncompliance.
The ordinal probit model did not perform perfectly. 
When applying the coefficient estimates to the actual data, 
the misclassification rate was 15.9%. In a small number of 
cases where no report was expected, subjects chose to 
disclose noncompliance. However, misclassification 
occurred primarily because the model predicted that all 
responses would fall into the two extreme categories, no 
report or compliance report. Therefore, all cases in which 
the subject chose oral communication, management letter, or 
footnotes were misclassified.
Separate ordinal probit models for each employment 
sector group were also estimated, excluding the employment 
sector variable and all interactions. These models are 
presented in Table 4.8. As the overall model indicated, 
only budget variance was significant for either group. 
Although both models are highly significant, the model for 
the legislative auditors has a notably lower 
misclassification rate of 12.1%, compared to 21.8% for the 
private practitioners.
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Table 4.8
Ordinal Probit of Reporting Decision on Budget Variance, 
Fiscal Stress, and Political Turnover
1 Legislative Auditors
| Variable Coefficient t - ratio
Constant - 5.069 - 14.141**
Budget Variance 1.097 15. 147**
Fiscal Stress 0.170 1.037
Political Turnover - 0.004 - 0.023
Mi 0.516 5. 209**
fl 2 0.914 6. 587**
fX 3 1.160 6.02 6**
X23 = 474.57“
Private Practitioners
Variable Coefficient t - ratio
Constant - 0.932 - 5.253“
Budget Variance 0.226 12.980“
Fiscal Stress 0.070 0.482
Political Turnover 0.040 0.277
Mi 0.272 4.391“
m2 0.753 7.529”
Ms 0.916 8.335“
X23 = 186.59“ ” p < .01
To investigate why the interaction of employment 
sector and budget variance is significant, the data for 
each group need to be analyzed. Table 4.9 presents the 
reporting decisions of the legislative auditors and private 
practitioners separately at each level of budget variance.
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Table 4.9
Reporting Decision by Budget Variance 
and Employment Sector
Legislative Auditors
Frequency 
Column % 4% Budget 
Variance
7 % Budget 
Variance
16% Budget 
Variance
No Report 125 
72.5 %
0 0
Oral
Communication
23 
13.3 %
4
2.3 %
4
2.3 %
Management
Letter
12 
6.9 %
6
3.5 %
0
Footnotes 9
5.2 %
0 0
Compliance Report 
or Opinion
4
2.3 %
160 
94.1 %
167 
97.7 %
Total 173 170 171
X28 = 455.01-
Frequency 
Column %
Private Practitioners
4% Budget 
Variance
7% Budget 
Variance
16% Budget 
Variance
No Report 81 
73.0 %
0 0
Oral
Communication
16 
14.4 %
2
1.8 %
0
Management
Letter
6
5.4 %
22 
20.0 %
8
7.3 %
Footnotes 4
3.6 %
6
5.5 %
4
3.7 %
Compliance Report 
or Opinion
4
3.6 %
80 
72.7 %
97 
89.0 %
Total 111 110 109
X28 = 280.74- p < . 01
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The table illustrates that for most subjects, if the budget 
variance was four percent, i.e., if the municipality was 
not in violation of the Budget Act, auditors would not 
report non-compliance.
However, at seven percent budget variance, the private 
practitioners reported at a lower level than legislative 
auditors. Only six percent of the legislative auditors 
reported noncompliance below the compliance report, whereas 
twenty-seven percent of the private practitioners did.
Most notably, twenty percent of private practitioners chose 
to report noncompliance in a management letter, whereas 
only 3.5% of legislative auditors chose this option. The 
same held true for cases with sixteen percent budget 
variance, although the difference between the two groups 
was less marked.
In general, legislative auditors seemed to see the 
issue as black and white: if the client was in compliance
with the law, there was no reporting, or at most there was 
only oral communication with the client about the budget 
variance. If, on the other hand, the municipality did not 
comply with the Budget Act (variance of '7% or 16%) , 
disclosure was made in the Compliance Report or in the 
Opinion on the Financial Statements.
In contrast, private practitioners tended to report at 
a lower level. Many of these subjects reported 
noncompliance in the footnotes or in a management letter,
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especially with budget variance of seven percent, rather 
than disclosing noncompliance in the Compliance Report or 
the Opinion. Private practitioners apparently judged the 
materiality of the noncompliance in making a reporting 
decision, whereas legislative auditors judged all 
noncompliance with the Budget Act as significant enough to 
include in the compliance report.
CONSENSUS
The final research hypothesis concerned consensus 
among governmental auditors. The longer governmental 
auditing experience of the legislative auditors should lead 
to more subspecialty expertise (Ashton, 1991) and therefore 
to higher consensus (Bonner and Lewis, 1990). Further, 
more experience within an organization should also result 
in more consensus (Meixner and Welker, 1988). This led to 
the final research hypothesis:
H4e: Legislative auditors will show higher consensus in
noncompliance reporting than will private 
practitioners.
Consensus in reporting was measured using Pearson's 
product-moment correlation coefficients. The reporting 
decisions of each auditor were correlated to the decisions 
of every other auditor, such that the correlations for each 
possible pair of subjects were determined. Following 
Ashton (1974) and Meixner and Welker (1988) the mean of
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these coefficients was then computed as a measure of 
overall consensus in reporting among subjects. The mean 
correlation of .943 demonstrates very high consensus, 
particularly in comparison to prior accounting research.4
Of interest in this research is whether the consensus 
among legislative auditors is higher than among private 
practitioners. The correlations between all possible pairs 
of legislative auditors resulted in a mean correlation of 
.975, with a minimum correlation of .697 and maximum of 
1.0. The mean correlation among all possible pairs of 
private practitioners was .896, with minimum correlation of 
.544 and maximum of 1.0. Although the consensus within 
each group was quite high, the mean correlation of the 
legislative audit group was significantly higher than that 
of the private practitioner group (p < .01). This 
supports the final hypotheses, H4E, that the legislative 
auditors would show higher consensus than the private 
practitioners.
STATISTICAL LIMITATIONS
The interpretation of the results is limited by a few 
factors. First, the subjects were not selected at random, 
limiting the generalizability of the conclusions beyond the
4 For example, Ashton (1974) and Meixner and Welker 
(1988) found mean correlations of .70, .373, and .73, 
respectively, among auditors making internal control 
judgments.
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participants. Similarly, the possibility of non-response 
bias must be considered. Responses of subjects who 
returned completed instruments after the initial request 
were compared to those returned after additional prompting. 
The early and late groups did not differ significantly 
either in chi-square tests or when a dummy variable was 
added to the ordinal probit model. Therefore it is not 
expected that nonrespondents would have differed from 
respondents in their reporting decisions.
Second, the letter from the Legislative Auditor may 
have influenced the results of the experiment. The letter 
was included to increase participation, and the high 
response rate suggests that the letter was successful. 
However, the letter may have caused some subjects to 
respond as they believed the Legislative Auditor wanted 
them to rather than as they would in a real audit, despite 
assurances that responses and names of participants would 
be kept confidential. The letter may also have altered the 
auditors' perceptions of the importance of the Louisiana 
Local Government Budget Act.
COMPARISON TO ACTUAL AUDIT DATA
In the development of this study, a sample of 100 
annual reports of municipalities and parishes in Louisiana 
were examined. Management letters that had been submitted 
to the Legislative Auditor, as required in the engagement
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letters, were also made available. As required by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for governments, 
these financial statements compared actual revenues and 
expenditures to the respective budgeted amounts. Budgets 
were presented as amended, and therefore compliance with 
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act could be 
determined.
Noncompliance with the Budget Act was commonplace 
among the municipalities sampled. Of the 100 reports 
examined, 40 revealed budget variances in excess of five 
percent.5 Reporting practices in the haphazard sample 
were markedly different from those found in this study. 
Although fiscal stress and political turnover were not 
determined, and all but two of the audits were performed by 
private practitioners, the response to budget variance bore 
virtually no resemblance to the experimental responses. 
Among the 100 sampled municipal and parish reports, there 
was no significant relationship between budget variance and 
noncompliance reporting. Table 4.10 presents the data from 
the haphazard sample.
In the experiment, most subjects reported any 
violation of the Budget Act (all cases with budget variance 
over five percent) in the Compliance Report. In the 
archival sample, numerous cases of noncompliance went
5 For the purposes of this discussion, budget variance 
refers to actual versus budgeted total expenditures for the 
General Fund.
107
Table 4.10
Budget Variance Versus Compliance Reporting Decisions: 
Haphazard Sample of 100 Municipalities
Reporting
Decision"
Mean 
Budget Variance
Range of Actual 
Budget Variance
No Report 7.1 % 0.2 - 27.4 %
Management Letter 1.7 % (only one report)
Footnotes 14.6 % 11.0 - 16.7 %
Compliance Report 17.6 % 5.4 - 41.5 %
“Highest reporting level used, e.g., if noncompliance was reported in 
the Compliance Report and a Management Letter, it is included in the 
Compliance Report figures.
unreported. To illustrate that these findings were not the 
result of isolated exceptions, Table 4.11 presents the 
frequency with which noncompliance was reported or not 
reported, with municipalities divided into ranges of budget 
variance. As indicated by the nonsignificant chi-square 
value, there was no difference among the levels of budget 
variance in the proportion of cases reported versus not 
reported.
This striking finding has a number of possible 
explanations. The sample of actual reports studied was not 
random, and therefore may not be representative of all 
municipal audits in Louisiana. It is possible that 
noncompliance with the Budget Act is reported more 
frequently in general. Participants in the study were not 
selected at random either, and it is possible that the
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subjects tended to report at higher levels than the 
population of governmental auditors would.
Table 4.11
Compliance Reporting among Sample Municipalities
Frequency 
Row Percentage
Noncompliance
Reported”
Noncompliance 
Not Reported
5 - 10 % 4 13
Budget Variance 24 % 76 %
10 - 15 % 2 8
Budget Variance 20 % 80 %
15 - 20 % 2 6
Budget Variance 25 % 75 %
over 20 % 3 2
Budget Variance 60 % 40 %
Total 11 29
X23 = 3 . 091 (p 5> .10)
“Noncompliance was considered reported if it was noted in the 
footnotes, the compliance report, the report on internal controls, or 
the opinion on the financial statements.
It seems likely, however, that the explanation for the 
difference between the experimental results and the actual 
audit data is not strictly an experimental artifact. As an 
initial investigation into compliance reporting decisions, 
this experiment was far less complex than an actual audit, 
by design. Municipal auditors must evaluate compliance 
with numerous laws and regulations simultaneously, and it 
is possible that the Budget Act gets overlooked or is 
considered less important than other laws with more
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potential impact on the financial statements. It is also 
likely that auditor independence is subject to more 
pressure in an actual audit than in this experiment, and 
auditor compromise may result in less frequent 
noncompliance reporting. These issues will be addressed 
further in the final discussion chapter of this 
dissertation.
SUMMARY
The statistical analysis discussed in this chapter 
demonstrates a few strong trends. Consensus among auditors 
was quite high, especially within the Legislative Audit 
group. The two groups of subjects, legislative auditors 
and private practitioners, both made reporting decisions 
based on budget variance but reacted to it somewhat 
differently. Though all subjects reported all cases of 
noncompliance, private practitioners reported it at a lower 
level on average.
For many of the participants in the study, the Budget 
Act cases presented were clear cut. If the municipality 
had not violated the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act, 
there was no need to report or even discuss noncompliance 
with the client. However, if noncompliance did occur, they 
reported it directly on the Compliance Report. Not all 
subjects followed this strategy, however. Many private 
practitioners used a lower level of reporting when the
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budget variance was seven percent, an amount where 
materiality may be questionable.
Lastly, none of the subjects was influenced by the 
fiscal stress or political turnover variables. This 
contradicts the findings of prior research (Deis and 
Giroux, 1992; Baber, 1990), and may suggest that 
independence impairment cannot be induced in an experiment 
of this nature. It is also possible, however, that because 
of the frequency of qualified opinions in governmental 
audits (Lynn and Gaffney, 1990), municipal clients may not 
resist disclosure, mitigating such pressures against 
auditors.
CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION
The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires 
that municipalities adopt an annual budget through the 
political process. If it becomes apparent that a 
municipality will exceed budgeted expenditures by five 
percent or more, a budget amendment must be adopted through 
that same political process, or the municipality is in 
noncompliance with the Budget Act. Government Auditing 
Standards require that governmental entities be audited not 
just for fair presentation in the financial statements, but 
also for compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
If noncompliance that has a material effect on the 
financial statements is found, the auditor is required to 
disclose it in the Compliance Report, one of the three 
reports issued by the auditor in a governmental engagement.
This study tested whether fiscal stress, political 
turnover, and employment sector impact the compliance 
reporting decisions of governmental auditors faced with 
varying degrees of noncompliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act. Budget variance, employment sector, 
and the interaction between the two factors were highly 
significant. Fiscal stress, political turnover, and their 
interactions with employment sector were all found to be 
statistically insignificant. In this chapter, the research
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findings, practical implications of the results, and 
questions raised will be discussed.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Budget Variance
The Louisiana Local Government Budget Act requires 
that a municipal budget be amended only if expenditures 
exceed the budget by five percent or more, and therefore 
cases with only four percent budget variance are in 
compliance with the Budget Act. Accordingly, most auditors 
did not report noncompliance when the budget variance was 
four percent. When the budget variance was seven or 
sixteen percent and the municipality failed to adopt a 
budget amendment, most auditors found some level of 
noncompliance reporting appropriate. However, once the 
budget variance exceeded the five percent threshold, there 
was less unanimity as to the appropriate level of 
reporting.
Some auditors reported noncompliance directly on the 
Compliance Report whether the variance was seven percent or 
sixteen percent. These auditors apparently used a "black 
or white" decision strategy, whereby municipalities 
complying with the Budget Act were not reported for the 
four percent variance, and municipalities not complying 
with the Act were reported at the highest level. Other 
auditors reported the sixteen percent variance cases on the
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Compliance Report but used lower level disclosure choices, 
such as footnotes or management letters, for the seven 
percent cases.
Recall that Government Auditing Standards require that 
instances of noncompliance with a material impact on the 
financial statements be reported. Those subjects who 
reported at a lower level for seven percent than for 
sixteen percent variance apparently had a materiality 
threshold between these two points, above which 
noncompliance was reported on the Compliance Report, but 
below which noncompliance was disclosed at a less visible 
level. Those who reported both seven percent and sixteen 
percent on the Compliance Report, however, may have 
considered both levels to be material noncompliance, or 
they may have considered any violation of the Budget Act 
significant enough in its own right to warrant reporting, 
regardless of materiality.
Materiality studies that have focused on private 
sector audits have found five to ten percent of net income 
to be the materiality threshold (Holstrum and Messier,
1982) . Although net income is not completely analogous to 
budget variance, it seems reasonable to expect that a 
similar materiality threshold of five to ten percent would 
be found in the governmental arena as well. Therefore the 
finding that seven percent budget variance was considered
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material by some auditors but not by others concurs with 
prior audit judgment research.
Employment Sector
Until July, 1991, local governments in Louisiana could 
engage auditors from either the private sector or from the 
Office of the Legislative Auditor. Legislative audit staff 
were expected to make different reporting decisions from 
private practitioners for a few reasons. First, the 
Legislative Audit staff are specialists in governmental 
accounting and may have more sub-specialty knowledge in 
auditing for compliance with laws and regulations. By 
contrast, certified public accountants in the private 
sector, whether self-employed or working for larger 
accounting firms, are likely to have a mixture of 
governmental and business clients, and they may be less 
knowledgeable about compliance issues.
Auditors in the private sector come from many firms 
from all over the state of Louisiana. They work for firms 
that have different priorities in continued training, in 
client retention, and in industry specialization. On the 
other hand, staff members for the Legislative Auditor 
specialize in governmental accounting and auditing. They 
work under established bureaucratic procedures, and they 
receive similar training in governmental auditing. These
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factors again may lead to increased sub-specialty knowledge 
among the legislative audit group.
Finally, differences between these two groups may 
arise from different perceptions of their roles as 
auditors. Kropatkin and Forrester (1983) observed that 
auditors employed in the private sector tend to paint the 
best possible picture of their clients, whereas auditors 
who are public employees tend to focus on seeking out 
errors in the auditee's records. This observation may 
result from a different outlook on the part of the auditors 
as to who their clients actually are in a governmental 
engagement.
As private practitioners, private sector auditors are 
accustomed to working with the management team of a client 
company to achieve an acceptable balance between full 
disclosure and client retention. They are also accustomed 
to making reporting decisions in light of materiality 
judgments. Conversely, as public employees who may view 
themselves as the public watchdogs, legislative auditors 
may consider the public at large —  and not municipal 
administrators or political leaders —  as the ultimate 
clients whose interests must be considered. Without the 
possibility of partnership and personal shares of client 
revenues, they have less incentive to appease a client by 
lowering the level of disclosure. They may also be
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accustomed to judging compliance itself, rather than making 
materiality judgments where noncompliance is concerned.
Legislative auditors reported noncompliance at higher 
levels than did private practitioners, members of the two 
groups responded differently to the budget variance levels, 
and there was higher consensus among legislative auditors 
than among private practitioners. These findings resulted 
primarily from reporting decisions for cases with budget 
variance of seven percent.
At four percent and sixteen percent budget variance, 
reporting decisions were similar between the two groups.
For the most part, private and public sector auditors 
reported nothing at four percent and disclosed 
noncompliance on the Compliance Report at sixteen percent. 
However, although most legislative auditors reported seven 
percent budget variance on the Compliance Report, many 
private sector auditors reported seven percent budget 
variance at lower levels, such as in footnotes or 
management letters. This was not always the case, though, 
as some private sector auditors did report seven percent 
budget variance on the Compliance Report. This explains 
the finding that there was less consensus among private 
practitioners (.896) than among legislative auditors 
(.975), although the consensus was quite high for both 
groups.
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Fiscal Stress
Fiscal stress was found not to impact the reporting 
decisions of the subjects in this experiment. This result 
is contrary to the findings of prior accounting research, 
which has found that audit quality was higher (Deis and 
Giroux, 1992) and that auditors were perceived to be likely 
to be pressured into underreporting when fiscal stress was 
present (Knapp, 1985).
The relationship between auditor judgments and fiscal 
stress has been explained as due to impaired auditor 
independence. If this is the correct interpretation, the 
lack of significance here may result from the experimental 
method used in this study. In a mailed experiment, where 
subjects are not required to interact with clients and are 
not concerned about future revenues, pressures against 
independence are difficult to duplicate. Even if such 
pressures were simulated in the experiment, subjects may 
not have considered how fiscal stress would affect their 
power vis a vis the client. Finally, the perceptions of 
Knapp's (1985, 1987) subjects may have been incorrect, and 
the correlation between audit quality and financial health 
found by Deis and Giroux (1992) may not extend to 
compliance reporting decisions.
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Political Turnover
Political turnover was chosen as an indicator of the 
political environment of the municipality, because it was 
believed that an incumbent mayor would be more likely to 
resist disclosure than someone who had just entered office 
after a competitive election, in which the budget may have 
been an issue. There was no evidence that political 
turnover had any effect on compliance reporting decisions.
Auditors may not have appreciated the role of 
accounting information in the political environment or they 
may not have considered how turnover might affect the 
pressure they would receive to underreport noncompliance. 
Perhaps other political variables, such as a pre-election 
(rather than post-election) fiscal year, an upcoming tax 
referendum, or some other variable would have affected 
auditor reporting decisions.
Comparison to Actual Audit Data
The difference between the actual data sample and the 
experimental results raises a number of questions.
Auditors in the haphazard sample may not have been as 
familiar with the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act as 
were the participants in the study. Municipalities are 
subject to so many laws and regulations that auditors may 
not be familiar with all of them. If this is the case, 
however, auditors may not be following due diligence. To
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perform an audit in accordance with Government Auditing 
Standards, auditors are required to obtain an understanding 
of laws generally recognized by auditors to have an effect 
on the financial statements (AICPA, 1989). The Budget Act 
is one of the pieces of legislation highlighted in the 
Louisiana Governmental Audit Guide (Society of Louisiana 
Certified Public Accountants, 1988), indicating such 
general recognition.
Is the failure to report an indication of lack of 
awareness of the Budget Act, or do auditors not consider 
violations of the Budget Act material to the financial 
statements? If auditors are not aware of the act, the 
answer must be to enforce Continuing Professional Education 
(CPE) requirements of auditors wishing to perform municipal 
audits. If the latter is the case, why would auditors not 
find even extreme violations material in actual audits yet 
consider them reportable in the experiment?
One answer to this question is that in the context of 
an actual municipal audit, where many laws and regulations 
must be considered simultaneously, the Budget Act may not 
receive the same focused attention that it did in this 
study. Auditors who are familiar with the Budget Act may 
choose to emphasize laws which have a clearly material 
impact on the statements or laws that, if broken, have 
serious legal ramifications.
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Noncompliance with the Budget Act may leave the 
municipality subject to a court-imposed freeze against any 
additional extra-budgeted expenditures, but by the time the 
audit is being performed, the municipality has generally 
moved into the next fiscal year with a new budget in place. 
The possibility of legal action is remote, and legal 
liability for the auditor is unlikely. Therefore, auditors 
may feel that the comparative presentation of budgeted 
versus actual revenues and expenditures, required by 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is sufficient to 
address the Budget Act. The lack of comparative figures in 
the experimental instrument may have increased the use of 
high level compliance reporting.
The letter from the Legislative Auditor, included in 
the experimental instrument to increase participation, also 
may have led subjects to respond at a higher level.
Although subjects were guaranteed anonymity, they may have 
responded as they thought they should rather than as they 
would in an actual audit. Additionally, pressures against 
independence were likely not simulated successfully in this 
study. In a client conflict situation, auditors may 
compromise with the client by agreeing to address budget 
variance only in the comparative statements rather than 
specifically reporting noncompliance with the Budget Act. 
Finally, in the context of a real audit, other factors not
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captured or manipulated here may affect the reporting 
decision process.
Summary
Sixty-eight governmental auditors participated in an 
experiment focusing on municipal adherence to the Louisiana 
Local Government Budget Act, to determine how budget 
variance, fiscal stress, political turnover, and employment 
sector affected auditors' noncompliance reporting 
decisions. Among the participants in this study, budget 
variance was the most significant factor in reporting 
decisions. The majority of subjects reported any 
noncompliance with the Budget Act directly in the 
Compliance Report. However, reporting patterns were 
different for auditors employed in the private sector than 
for auditors employed by the Legislative Auditor of 
Louisiana, with the legislative auditors reporting at a 
higher level on average.
At the lowest level of budget variance (4 percent), 
and the highest level (16 percent), reporting patterns of 
the two groups were essentially the same: four percent
does not violate the Budget Act, so most auditors did not 
report noncompliance anywhere; sixteen percent was 
considered by most auditors to be material noncompliance, 
and was generally reported in the Compliance Report. The 
difference between the two groups was significant when
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budget variance was seven percent, however. Legislative 
Audit staff reported noncompliance on the Compliance Report 
in such cases, whereas many private sector auditors 
reported noncompliance in a management letter or in the 
footnotes when budget variance was seven percent.
For the vast majority of auditors, neither fiscal 
stress nor political turnover had a significant impact on 
noncompliance reporting decisions. Political turnover did 
not impact the reporting decisions of a single participant 
in this experiment. However, a small number of auditors 
did choose higher reporting levels if fiscal stress was 
present than if it was absent. It seems likely, given the 
overwhelming significance of budget variance, that auditors 
would not alter their judgments regardless of the political 
environment of the budget. Fiscal stress and political 
turnover, or some other indicator of the political 
environment, may have more of an impact on auditor 
reporting decisions if the compliance issue were a law or 
regulation with less clear-cut boundaries between 
compliance and noncompliance.
Finally, consensus among auditors was quite high. 
Legislative auditors were in almost complete agreement as 
to where and when noncompliance should be reported. 
Consensus among private practitioners was somewhat lower 
but was still quite high. This reduced consensus is 
attributable primarily to agreement among legislative
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auditors but variability among private practitioners as to 
where seven percent variance cases should be reported.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Compliance auditing has not been the subject of much 
academic research to date, particularly behavioral 
research. Before complex decisions can be analyzed, some 
of the basic assumptions about reporting decisions must be 
tested. As a result, this study was quite simplistic in 
comparison to the contextually rich environment of 
governmental auditing. Focusing on only one law made it 
easy for the subjects to attend to that law and evaluate 
compliance. This may have caused subjects to report 
noncompliance more commonly than they would in practice.
The subjects of this study were not selected at 
random. Therefore, any findings as to the significance of 
budget variance, employment sector, fiscal stress, and 
political turnover are statistically valid only among the 
subjects, and conclusions about the importance of these 
factors to governmental auditors in general must be made 
with caution. The differential response rate between the 
two groups may also have heightened the significance of the 
employment sector variable.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
This experiment is one of the first to investigate 
specifically the decision making of governmental auditors. 
The quality of governmental audits has been a concern of 
the U.S. government and the AICPA for the past decade, but 
it is only beginning to receive attention in the academic 
literature. There has been extensive research into the 
decisions of auditors in areas such as internal control 
evaluations, materiality judgments, and even reporting, but 
these studies have focused on the audits of private sector 
businesses.
This study extends previous research by considering 
governmental auditing and the added role auditors play in 
evaluating compliance with laws and regulations. The 
Louisiana Local Government Budget Act was chosen for this 
study because it is directly relevant to the financial 
statements, and auditors should be familiar with the 
content and the importance of municipal budgets.
The participants in this study reflected an 
understanding of the law in their reporting decisions, but 
there were clearly differences between how private 
practitioners and legislative auditors chose to disclose 
noncompliance with the Budget Act. This lends support to 
the increasing notion in accounting research that it is 
sub-specialty knowledge, not length of experience, which 
leads to expertise in audit judgment. It also suggests
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that legislative auditors are more compliance oriented than 
private practitioners.
The practical implications of these findings are 
potentially significant. The Office of the Legislative 
Auditor was permitted to bid on municipal audits in 
Louisiana until 1991, when complaints of unfair competition 
led the Louisiana Legislature to restrict bidding on 
municipal audits to private practitioners. This legal 
shift has improved opportunities in governmental auditing 
for small audit firms. However, if private practitioners 
do not place the same emphasis on compliance issues, it may 
result in lowered audit quality. It is possible that the 
problems of poor quality governmental audits discovered on 
the federal level in the 1980s will threaten the value and 
reliability of audited financial statements at the local 
level of government.
Conversely, the Yellow Book requires auditors to 
report noncompliance only if it is material to the 
financial statements. If legislative auditors report all 
instances of noncompliance, they may be exceeding the 
requirements and even the intent of GAS reporting 
standards. Users of audit reports may have difficulty 
extracting the most important pieces of information from an 
all-inclusive report. Future audit standards and 
interpretations should clarify the relationship between 
materiality and noncompliance as well as the role of
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significant, but nonmaterial, items in the compliance 
report.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The differences between the haphazard sample and the 
experimental results are striking and suggest the need for 
further investigation of actual reporting decisions as well 
as further experimentation. It would be worthwhile to 
select a random sample, or even the full population of 
municipal annual reports, and look for factors that may be 
influencing reporting decisions. Such factors could 
include those tested in this study as well as others 
investigated in future experiments.
The results of this study indicate that employment 
sector plays a role in the differences in reporting 
decisions. Future research should examine whether this 
difference is due to subspecialty knowledge, uniform 
management, approaches to compliance reporting in general, 
or some combination of the three. The answer to this 
question would surely raise additional questions, such as 
how sub-specialty knowledge is attained and how it can be 
measured. Discovering the extent to which sub-specialty 
knowledge in combination with other personal factors 
affects judgments in governmental auditing as well as other 
accounting disciplines will enable researchers to work with 
practitioners to improve the quality of public accounting.
If a different view of the role of governmental 
auditors drives the finding of group differences, the 
profession must consider which approach best serves the 
needs of financial statement users and provide more 
specific guidance. Finally, if the result stems from the 
uniform training and management, it may be necessary for 
the AICPA to standardize CPE in the governmental field to 
overcome the historically poor quality of governmental 
audits.
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INTRODUCTION
You have been engaged as the external auditor for the 
town of Pemberton, Louisiana. This exercise will ask you 
to make compliance reporting decisions as part of your 
audit of Pemberton. The law considered in this exercise is 
the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act. Pemberton may 
or may not be in violation of the Act.
Pemberton has a population of 4600. According to the 
1990 U.S. Census, a town of this size would be larger than 
approximately 78% of the towns in Louisiana. Pemberton has 
a mayor-council form of government. Pemberton has annual 
General Fund expenditures exceeding $250,000, making it 
subject to the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act. Over 
the past ten-year period, approximately 75% of Pemberton's 
General Fund revenues have come from local sales taxes. 
Although state grants and shared revenues have been 
significant for funding capital projects, they have 
accounted for less than 5% of the General Fund revenues in 
the past ten years.
The state of Louisiana requires Pemberton to submit 
audited GAAP-basis financial statements every year. The 
town receives less than $100,000 in federal aid each year, 
so a Single Audit is not necessary. Therefore, the audit 
is to be performed in accordance with Government Auditing 
Standards.
Sixteen cases have been developed concerning your 
audit of Pemberton. Please consider each case 
independently. The next page of this booklet contains 
instructions, followed by a description of seven possible 
conditions that might exist in each of the cases. Each 
case contains a different set of three of these seven 
conditions. The identifying words for each condition have 
been highlighted within the descriptions.
A summary of the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act 
is included with this exercise. You may refer to the 
summary of the Act as well as the list of conditions as 
often as you feel necessary.
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INSTRUCTIONS
This exercise contains sixteen audit cases for the 
hypothetical town of Pemberton, Louisiana. For each case 
you will be asked for your compliance reporting decision 
regarding the Louisiana Local Government Budget Act.
Record your answers to each of the questions by circling 
the number that reflects your answer. Please answer all 
questions for each case and for the brief questionnaire 
that follows. Consider each case independently. Please do 
not refer back to cases you have already completed, and do 
not discuss the exercise with your colleagues, as this may 
affect their responses to the cases.
There are no right or wrong answers. Your responses 
will be kept strictly confidential. Your individual 
responses will not be discussed with anyone, and any data 
gathered from this exercise will be presented only in 
summary form.
When you have completed the exercise, please return it 
in the enclosed stamped, pre-addressed envelope. In 
addition to returning the cases, please send your name and 
address separately on the enclosed postcard, indicating 
whether or not you would like to receive a summary of the 
results when this study has been completed.
Thank you very much for your assistance with this 
project.
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POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR EACH CASE
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 4% WITHOUT 
AMENDING THE BUDGET.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 7% WITHOUT 
AMENDING THE BUDGET.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 16% 
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
As far as you are able to determine, EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
and TAX REVENUES in Pemberton are expected to be FAIRLY 
STABLE in the foreseeable future.
You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR EMPLOYER 
in the area CLOSED. Indications are that this closure has 
led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS EROSION IN SALES 
TAX REVENUES.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving 
his third term.
During the year for which you are auditing the financial 
statements, the voters of Pemberton elected a NEW MAYOR who 
defeated the incumbent in a HIGHLY COMPETITIVE ELECTION.
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SUMMARY OF THE LOUISIANA LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ACT 
L.S.A.-R.S. 39:1301 - 1316
The following summary contains excerpts from the Louisiana 
Local Government Budget Act (hereafter "The Act"). This 
summary is not all-inclusive, but contains the information 
necessary to complete the experiment.
The Act applies to all political subdivisions in the state 
with a general fund with proposed expenditures totaling at 
least $250,000.
Each political subdivision must prepare a comprehensive 
budget presenting the complete financial plan for the 
ensuing fiscal year for each fund.
The budget document must include a consolidated statement 
showing beginning fund balances, estimates of receipts and 
revenues, recommended expenditures, and estimated ending 
fund balances.
Political subdivisions with total proposed expenditures of 
at least $250,000 must afford the public an opportunity to 
participate in the budgetary process prior to adoption of 
the budget.
When there has been a change in operations, such that 
actual expenditures plus projected expenditures within a 
given fund are exceeding the budget by five percent or 
more, the governing authority must adopt a budget amendment 
in an open meeting.
The adopted budget and any duly authorized amendments 
constitute the authority of the officers to incur 
liabilities and authorize expenditures.
In the event of violations of The Act, any person may 
commence a suit for mandamus, injunctive, or declaratory 
relief to require compliance with the provisions of this 
Act.
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SAMPLE CASE A
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 4% 
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
As far as you are able to determine, EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
and TAX REVENUES in Pemberton are expected to be FAIRLY 
STABLE in the foreseeable future.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving 
his third term.
In light of the information you have, would you report 
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES NO
If you answered YES, where would you report 
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
Do you think another governmental auditor might make a 
different reporting decision?
YES NO UNSURE
If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe 
another auditor would report noncompliance? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
6. No communication
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SAMPLE CASE B
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 7% 
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR 
EMPLOYER in the area CLOSED. Indications are that this 
closure has led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS 
EROSION IN SALES TAX REVENUES.
The MAYOR of this town is a POPULAR INCUMBENT serving 
his third term.
a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a a * a
In light of the information you have, would you report 
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES NO
If you answered YES, where would you report 
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
Do you think another governmental auditor might make a 
different reporting decision?
YES NO UNSURE
If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe 
another auditor would report noncompliance? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
6. No communication
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SAMPLE CASE C
You have determined that two years ago, a MAJOR 
EMPLOYER in the area CLOSED. Indications are that this 
closure has led to REDUCED LOCAL SPENDING and a SERIOUS 
EROSION IN SALES TAX REVENUES.
During the year for which you are auditing the 
financial statements, the voters of Pemberton elected a NEW 
MAYOR who defeated the incumbent in a HIGHLY COMPETITIVE 
ELECTION.
In auditing for compliance with the Louisiana Local 
Government Budget Act, you have discovered that Pemberton 
EXCEEDED its budgeted General Fund expenditures BY 16% 
WITHOUT AMENDING THE BUDGET.
A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A A * A
In light of the information you have, would you report 
noncompliance with the Local Government Budget Act?
YES NO
If you answered YES, where would you report 
noncompliance with the Budget Act, if anywhere? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
Do you think another governmental auditor might make a 
different reporting decision?
YES NO UNSURE
If you answered YES or UNSURE, where do you believe 
another auditor would report noncompliance? (Circle as 
many as apply.)
1. Oral communication with the client
2. Management letter
3. Footnotes to the financial statements
4. Compliance report
5. Opinion on the financial statements
6. No communication
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